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California’s Unpredictable Res Judicata 

(Claim Preclusion) Doctrine 

WALTER W. HEISER* 
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of res judicata describes a set of rules that determine the 
preclusive effects of a final judgment on the merits.  The California 
doctrine has two familiar components: a primary aspect, “res judicata” 
or claim preclusion; and a secondary aspect, “collateral estoppel” or 
issue preclusion. Under the claim preclusion aspect, a prior judgment 
bars the parties (or those in privity with them) from relitigating the 
“same cause of action” in a subsequent proceeding.1  Under the issue
preclusion aspect, although a second suit between the same parties on a 
different cause of action is not precluded by a prior judgment, the first 
judgment operates as a conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the 
second action as were “actually litigated and determined” in the prior 
proceeding.2 
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  B.A., 1968, University of 
Michigan; J.D., 1971, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1978, Harvard Law School. 
1. See, e.g., Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594 (Cal. 1975); Agarwal v.
Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979).
2. See Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 n.3 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 920 (1991); People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1982). 
The California courts usually rely on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
(1982) when resolving collateral estoppel questions.  See, e.g., Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225
n.3 (citing § 27 of the RESTATEMENT and adopting its content); Sims, 651 P.2d at 331 
(relying on RESTATEMENT § 27, comment d, to determine whether an issue was “actually
litigated” in a prior proceeding); see also cases cited infra note 74.  Although claim and 
issue preclusion are interrelated doctrines, see infra note 167, any extended discussion of
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The California doctrine of res judicata is largely the product of judge-
made law.3 In developing this doctrine, the courts have sought to 
promote various efficiency notions, commonly referred to as judicial 
economy.  More specifically, the California courts have identified two 
related reasons for res judicata: (1) “to curtail multiple litigation causing 
vexation and expense to the parties” and (2) to prevent “wasted effort
and expense in judicial administration.”4  Res judicata is therefore
intended to protect both the parties and the courts.  Res judicata protects
parties by eliminating the costs of multiple lawsuits, bringing an end to 
litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments, encouraging reliance on 
adjudication, and fostering repose through certainty, stability, and 
finality of judgments.5  It protects the courts by conserving judicial 
California’s collateral estoppel doctrine is beyond the scope of the instant Article. 
However, in a related article in this volume examining California’s collateral estoppel 
doctrine, Professor Heiser discusses how the California courts have developed a 
confusing and seemingly contradictory approach to the definition of what issues are 
barred from relitigation because they were “actually litigated and determined” in a prior 
proceeding involving a different cause of action, and what may be done to improve that 
judicial approach. SEE Walter W. Heiser, California’s Confusing Collateral Estoppel
(Issue Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 509 (1998) [hereinafter Heiser,
Collateral Estoppel].
3. The California Supreme Court developed the claim and the issue preclusion
components of res judicata over the course of several years. See, e.g., Slater, 543 P.2d at 
594-97 (distinguishing primary rights from theories of recovery for claim preclusion
purposes); Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225-32 (identifying threshold requirements and defining
public policy considerations for issue preclusion); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust 
& Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Cal. 1947) (rejecting the mutuality doctrine as a 
requirement of collateral estoppel); Sims, 651 P.2d at 326-30 (extending res judicata 
principles to administrative proceedings). 
Although the basic res judicata doctrine has never been codified, a few statutes do help
define the rules. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1047 (Deering 1996) (authorizing 
successive actions on same contract); Id. § 1049 (providing that an action is deemed 
pending until final determination on appeal); Id. § 1062 (providing that a declaratory
relief judgment shall not preclude a party from obtaining additional relief on the same 
facts); Id. §§ 1908-12 (Deering 1972) (defining various effects of a final judgment); and 
Id. §§ 426.10 & 426.30 (Deering 1995) (defining compulsory cross-complaints). 
4. Nakash v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 241 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (Ct.
App. 1987) (quoting 7 BERNARD E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, JUDGMENT, § 188, at
621 (3d ed. 1985)) (emphasis deleted).  In Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1944),
the California Supreme Court offered the following two reasons for res judicata: “(1) That
the defendant should be protected against vexatious litigation; and (2) that it is against public
policy to permit litigants to consume the time of the courts by re-litigating matters already
judicially determined, or by asserting claims which properly should have been settled in
some prior action.”  See also Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242, 243 (Cal. 1943).
5. Balanced against this strong policy to achieve judicial economy is, of course, a 
party’s right to be heard on the merits of her claims.  Due process safeguards a litigant’s right
to a full and fair opportunity to procedurally, substantively, and evidentially pursue a claim;
but does not afford a litigant more than one opportunity for such judicial resolution.  See,
e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329-333 (1971);
Montana v. United States., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940); see also Sims, 651 P.2d at 329 (ruling that party to be collaterally estopped by a prior 
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resources, promoting efficient judicial administration, and bringing an 
end to a case so that the court may allocate its limited judicial resources
to the resolution of other matters.6 
A successful res judicata doctrine furthers judicial economy in both a 
substantive and an administrative manner.  The substantive goal of the 
claim preclusion component is to define what rights are extinguished by
a final judgment such that parties are barred from pursuing multiple 
lawsuits to resolve disputes which could have been resolved in one 
proceeding. A definition broad in scope as to what rights are 
extinguished obviously furthers this goal of judicial economy more 
effectively than a less inclusive one. The California courts, by 
employing the primary rights theory,7 have opted for a narrow view of 
what substantive rights are extinguished by a judgment.  By definitional 
design, therefore, the California claim preclusion doctrine contains a
fundamental diseconomy—one which sometimes permits parties to
litigate aspects of a unitary controversy in two lawsuits even though they 
could have otherwise presented their entire dispute in one. This 
substantive inefficiency, curious in a time of great concern over 
excessive litigation and limited judicial resources, is a sufficient reason
by itself to strongly criticize California’s claim preclusion doctrine and
call for its revision.8  But it is not the only reason. 
The administrative goal of any res judicata doctrine is to provide clear
rules, predictable in their application and foreseeable in their
consequences, which will eliminate unnecessary and avoidable 
litigation, and do so in a fair manner. Regardless of whether the chosen
claim preclusion standard is a substantively broad or narrow one, the res 
judicata rules should be easy to understand and administer.  An ideal 
agency decision must have been provided an adequate opportunity to fully present claims 
during the administrative hearing); Vella v. Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 31 (Cal. 1977) (quoting In
re Crow, 483 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1971) and stating that the doctrine of res judicata “rests upon
the sound policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair adversary
hearing on an issue from again drawing it into controversy”). 
6. For a thorough discussion of the policies underlying res judicata, see Robert Ziff,
Note, For One Litigant’s Sole Relief: Unforeseeable Preclusion and the Second 
Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 910-23 (1992).
7. For a description of the primary rights theory see infra Part II.B.
 8. Robin James, Comment, Res Judicata: Should California Abandon Primary
Rights?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 351 (1989), contains an excellent discussion of ambiguities of 
the California res judicata doctrine and its substantive diseconomies, and concludes that
California should abandon its reliance on the primary rights doctrine.  The first part of the 
discussion of the primary rights theory in the instant article replows some of the same
ground already tilled by that student comment.
 561





























   
doctrine would operate smoothly and foreseeably so that parties and
judges do not spend time and resources litigating res judicata questions. 
Clear, understandable res judicata rules promote efficient judicial 
administration in a variety of related ways.  First, they inform parties as 
to what matters they must pursue in a single lawsuit or forever be
foreclosed, and thereby assure the parties that the resolution of these 
matters will be final and conclusive.  To accomplish this efficiency goal, 
and accomplish it fairly, any doctrine of res judicata should provide clear
warning to parties as to which claims and issues they must present in 
initial litigation, and which ones they may legitimately reserve for 
resolution in a subsequent proceeding.9 Clear res judicata rules provide a 
degree of predictability which allow parties to structure their litigation 
conduct with some assurance as to when that conduct will or will not
foreclose presentation of claims and issues in a subsequent proceeding. 
Conversely, unpredictable standards may discourage parties from 
presenting certain claims and issues in an initial proceeding in the 
mistaken belief that these matters may be pursued in subsequent 
litigation. Parties cannot know what claims and issues they must raise to
avoid preclusion unless they know what the preclusion rules require
them to raise.
Second, a res judicata doctrine should not only bar relitigation of
claims and issues in successive proceedings, but should also minimize
disagreements over what claims and issues are barred.  A successful res
judicata doctrine, from an efficient judicial administration viewpoint, is
one which achieves its intended substantive preclusive effects with little 
or no judicial enforcement.  Uncertain preclusion rules undermine this 
efficiency goal.  Ambiguous preclusion standards may encourage a
plaintiff to commence subsequent litigation that clearer rules would have 
discouraged. Likewise, both parties in subsequent litigation may involve 
the court in threshold motions regarding the preclusive effects of a prior 
judgment which, under more precise rules, the parties would forgo as 
untenable.10 
This Article discusses California’s claim preclusion doctrine from the
viewpoint of administrative judicial economy, and concludes that the 
9. For an excellent general discussion of the problems caused by unpredictable
preclusion rules, see Ziff, supra note 6, and James, supra note 8, at 407-410.  Ziff, supra 
note 6, at 910-26, 927, discusses the costs associated with unforeseeable preclusion in light
of the various policies underlying res judicata—fairness to litigants, repose through finality
of judgments, reliance on and accuracy of judgments, and efficient allocation of judicial
resources. He concludes that to be more foreseeable, the preclusion laws must be both clear
and underinclusive: “[T]he proper model of res judicata law is, whenever possible, to
establish clear rules, with some flexible exceptions used in rare cases, that serve only to 
block, but never to invoke, preclusion in unforeseeable situations.”  Id.
10. See Ziff, supra note 6, at 917-18, 923.
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doctrine as developed and applied by the California courts fails to 
achieve the basic goal of efficient judicial administration.  Instead of
clear, understandable, easy-to-administer rules, the California courts 
have developed a doctrine that is ambiguous, confusing, and 
complicated.  The courts apply the doctrine in a manner which fails to 
provide litigants fair warning of what matters must be raised or forever 
barred. Even worse, the current claim preclusion doctrine actually 
misleads parties and invites tactical errors.  The source of these problems
is the California courts’ failure to  develop a clear and predictable 
definition of “cause of action” for claim preclusion purposes.
Consequently, the overall res judicata doctrine is so unpredictable that it 
actually causes inefficient use of court and litigant resources by 
encouraging subsequent litigation over the preclusive effects of prior 
judgments.11 
Part II of this Article begins with a general comparison of the 
California claim preclusion doctrine with that of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments. Part II then explains the historical development 
of California’s claim preclusion doctrine and its reliance on the primary
rights theory, and continues with an analysis of modern California 
Supreme Court decisions defining this claim preclusion standard.  Part II 
next discusses the difficulties the lower courts have encountered when
applying the primary rights theory, and focuses on some important lines
of cases where the courts of appeal have reached conflicting conclusions 
when applying this res judicata standard to the same set of facts.
Finally, Part III offers some suggestions to correct the unpredictable 
nature, as well as the attendant administrative and substantive 
inefficiencies, of California’s current res judicata doctrine.  The main
recommendation is that the California Supreme Court should jettison the
primary rights theory and formally adopt the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments as California’s claim preclusion doctrine. 
11. In addition to the unpredictable definition of “cause of action” for claim 
preclusion purposes, the various judicial interpretations of what issues are precluded under
the seemingly straightforward collateral estoppel aspect are facially inconsistent and 
confusing. See Heiser, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 2.  When the claim and issue
preclusion components are combined, these respective problems are compounded rather than
reduced. See generally id.  Because there is a close relationship between the definition of a
cause of action and the dimension of the issue precluded by collateral estoppel,
improvements in the predictability of California’s claim preclusion doctrine will likely mean 
improvements in the predictability of California’s issue preclusion doctrine. See id. at 558;
see also  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT],
quoted in relevant part infra note 167.
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II. CALIFORNIA’S UNPREDICTABLE CLAIM PRECLUSION DOCTRINE




The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or persons in privity12 
with them from relitigating the same cause of action that has been finally 
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.  In other words, a single
cause of action cannot be split and made the subject of separate 
lawsuits.13  On this general level, the California doctrine prohibiting
claim-splitting is similar to the doctrine set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments.14  Under both doctrines, a valid and final 
judgment operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between
the same parties or their privies on the “same cause of action.”15 
Likewise, both doctrines bar a second suit on the same cause of action 
even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second suit to present
different evidence, grounds for relief, or legal theories than those 
presented in the first action; or to seek new forms of relief not demanded 
12. The concept of “privity” traditionally refers to certain limited circumstances
where a person, although not a party, is bound by a judgment because of some specific 
relationship with the party and where the nonparty’s interests were adequately
represented by the party. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 34-61; CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1908(a)-(b) (Deering Supp. 1998); Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098,
1102 (Cal. 1978) (expanding concept of privity beyond traditional applications to any
relationship between the party to be precluded and the unsuccessful party in the prior 
litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of res judicata).
13. See Wulfjen v. Dolton, 151 P.2d 846, 848 (Cal. 1944); RESTATEMENT, supra note 
11, §§ 18 & 19.
14. See authorities cited supra note 13.
 15. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Section 17 explains the effects of 
a former adjudication as follows: 
A valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, except
on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent: 
(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the claim is extinguished 
and merged in the judgment and a new claim may arise on the judgment
(see § 18);
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, the claim is extinguished
and the judgment bars a subsequent action on that claim (see § 19); 
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is
conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a
different claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined 
if its determination was essential to that judgment (see § 27). 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 17. 
Section 18 further defines the general rule of merger and provides that a judgment 
rendered in favor of the plaintiff precludes another action by the plaintiff on the original 
claim, although not an action upon the judgment. See id. § 18. Section 19 reiterates the 
general rule of bar and provides that a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant on 
the merits bars another action by the plaintiff on the “same claim.” Id. § 19. 
564
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in the first action.16  Under both doctrines, however, if the cause of
action asserted in the prior litigation is not the same as that in the second
proceeding, the judgment in the prior litigation does not constitute a bar
to the subsequent proceeding.17 
Of primary importance to both res judicata doctrines, therefore, is the
definition of the same cause of action.  Here the California Supreme 
Court and the Restatement part company.  The Restatement defines the 
“claim”18 extinguished by a prior judgment to include “all rights of the
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part 
of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the 
action arose.”19  By contrast, the California Supreme Court adheres to a 
definition of “cause of action” based on a natural law construct known as
16. See RESTATEMENT supra note 11, § 25; Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d
242, 244 (Cal. 1943) (holding that judgment for defendant in prior suit barred second suit to
recover for same injuries even though based on an entirely different factual basis of
negligence); Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594-95 (Cal. 1975) (holding that a prior
defense judgment based upon statutory negligence barred a second action against the
defendant for the same personal injuries even though based upon a different theory of
ordinary negligence); Wulfjen v. Dutton, 151 P.2d 846, 849 (Cal. 1944) (holding that
judgment for defendant in prior fraud action for recission of contract precluded second fraud
action for damages).
17. In Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979), the court observed that 
“[u]nless the requisite identity of causes of action is established, however, the first judgment
will not operate as a bar.”
18. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS uses the term “claim” to describe the 
scope of the matter extinguished by a judgment; California uses the older term “cause of
action” for the same purpose.  These terms are used in many ways for many purposes, and
have various meanings in different contexts, which make their use for res judicata purposes
even more confusing.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 23, at 195-96; Bay Cities Paving 
& Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Cal. 1993) (construing
“cause of action” as used in a malpractice insurance policy to determine coverage);
Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458, 460-61 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(distinguishing “cause of action” in the summary adjudication statute, where it means theory
of liability, from the res judicata context, where it means the invasion of a primary right);
Slater, 543 P.2d at 595 (observing that the phrase cause of action is “often used
indiscriminately to mean what it says and to mean counts which state differently the same
cause of action”).  In this Article, “claim” and “cause of action” are used interchangeably
and, for the most part, only in the res judicata sense.
19. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24(1).  Section 24(2) provides the following
additional explanation of this transactional approach:
What factual grouping constitutes a “transaction”, and what groupings 
constitute a “series”, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such 
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business 
understanding or usage. 
Id. § 24(2).
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the “primary rights theory.”20 
Under the California primary rights theory, the invasion of one 
primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.21  The most salient 
characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible: The violation of a 
single primary right gives rise to but one cause of action which cannot 
be split and made the subject of separate lawsuits.22  However, a single 
wrongful act which violates two primary rights gives rise to two causes 
20. See, e.g., Agarwal, 603 P.2d at 72; Slater, 543 P.2d at 594.
 21. See Slater, 543 P.2d at 594.
22. See id.; see also Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal. 1984). There 
are a few circumstances where claim-splitting is condoned; the first is where the parties 
have agreed that the plaintiff may split her claim, or where the court in the first action 
has expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain a second action. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 20 & 26; United Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunt, 34 P.2d 
1001, 1004 (Cal. 1934) (holding that party waived right to raise res judicata because 
conduct pursued by court and counsel in prior lawsuit was tantamount to an express 
determination on the part of the court with the consent of opposing counsel to reserve the
issues for future adjudication); see also Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 231 P.2d 
6, 9 (Cal. 1951) (ruling res judicata inapplicable as to any matters which court in prior 
action refused to determine and which it directed should be litigated in another forum or
action); Cohn v. Cohn, 59 P.2d 969, 971 (Cal. 1936) (ruling that defendant’s failure to 
object to plaintiff’s splitting of a single cause of action during trial or appeal constituted 
a waiver of defendant’s right to object on that ground); Ferraro v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 
162 Cal. Rptr. 238, 244 (Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that the prohibition against splitting a 
cause of action is for the benefit of the defendant and he may waive or renounce it by
agreement); Recent Decisions, Actions: Res Judicata: Waiver Where Defendant 
Prevented Litigation of Entire Demand in Prior Action, 23 CAL. L. REV. 205-206 (1934).
A second circumstance is where a statute authorizes claim-splitting. See e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1062 (Deering 1996) (providing that a judgment of declaratory relief shall 
not preclude any party from obtaining additional relief based on the same set of facts).
A frequently encountered exception to the general rule prohibiting claim-splitting 
exists when the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or seek a
certain remedy in the first action because of limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction
or the existence of other formal barriers to full presentation of the claim in the first 
action, and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek that 
remedy or form of relief.  See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 26(c); see, e.g., Vella v.
Hudgins, 572 P.2d 28, 31 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the limited jurisdiction and summary
nature of a prior unlawful detainer judgment had prevented defendant from fully
litigating the issue of title to property); People v. Damon, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 514 (Ct.
App. 1996) (concluding that rule against splitting a cause of action was inapplicable 
where plaintiff was statutorily prohibited from seeking cumulative remedies in one 
proceeding); Gouvis Eng’g v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785, 790 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that allocations of liability approved by a court at a good faith settlement
hearing has no res judicata effect in a subsequent indemnity action because the scope of
substantive inquiry and potential for development of evidence was much more restricted
than the corresponding opportunity afforded in the indemnity action); Branson v. Sun-
Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 323 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting and applying §
26(1)(c) of the second RESTATEMENT); Merry v. Coast Community College Dist., 158 
Cal. Rptr. 603, 610-11 (Ct. App. 1979) (observing that where the court in a prior action 
did not have jurisdiction to entertain an omitted legal theory or ground, res judicata does 
not preclude the presentation of the omitted theory or ground through a second action in
a competent court).
566
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of action. Moreover, where a plaintiff has more that one cause of action 
against a defendant, the plaintiff may join them in one lawsuit but is not
required to do so either by the rules of joinder or res judicata.23  In other
words, a plaintiff who has two causes of action against a defendant may
proceed with two separate lawsuits.  A judgment in one lawsuit will
have no claim preclusive effect on the other.24  The California doctrine 
therefore makes of central importance the definition of “cause of action” 
and, concomitantly, of “primary right.”  A clear definition with
predictable applications is essential to guide parties and judges.  As we
shall see, however, the California courts have failed to articulate a clear
definition.
Before discussing the California primary rights theory in any greater
detail, additional comparison to the Restatement approach is useful.  As
explained above, under the Restatement, a valid and final judgment 
precludes subsequent litigation of all rights of the parties to relief with
respect to the transaction out of which the action arose.25 The 
Restatement approach is unconcerned with whether an out-of-court event 
violates one or more separate primary rights, or vests the parties with 
multiple substantive theories of recovery or forms of relief.  Instead, the 
Restatement instructs the parties to litigate all rights to remedies which
arise from the factual transaction that gave rise to the lawsuit, regardless 
of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded during the 
transaction. Any such rights to relief not raised will be extinguished by 
the judgment. 
The following hypothetical illustrates the differences in the two
23. With the exception of certain cross-complaints, joinder of causes of action is
permissive, not mandatory. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 427.10, 428.10, 428.30 (Deering
1995) (complaints and cross-complaints).  A plaintiff may, if she desires, bring a separate
lawsuit on each cause of action even though permitted to join all of them in one complaint.
See, e.g., Realty Constr. & Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court, 132 P. 1048, 1049 (Cal. 1913)
(holding that a plaintiff who is authorized to unite two different causes of action in a single
complaint is not required to do so; the right of joinder may be exercised at the plaintiff’s 
option, and the defendant has no ground to object if the plaintiff brings a separate lawsuit as
to each cause of action); Sanderson v. Niemann, 110 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Cal. 1941) (ruling 
that joinder of two separate causes of action was permissible but not mandatory); Sawyer v. 
First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403, 405 (Ct. App. 1981).
24. See cases cited supra note 23.  The prior judgment may, of course, have issue
preclusive effects in subsequent litigation between the parties.  See, e.g., Producers Dairy
Delivery Co., v. Sentry Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 920, 923 (Cal. 1986); Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal. 1947); Sutphin v. Speik, 99 P.2d
652, 655 (Cal. 1940); Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916, 918 (Cal. 1934).
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24. 
 567


























doctrines. Assume that plaintiff purchased a gas water heater directly 
from the defendant manufacturer.  Shortly after installation, the water 
heater exploded, apparently due to a defective thermostat, and started a
fire. Plaintiff’s house and its contents were destroyed by the fire, and 
plaintiff suffered serious burns.  Plaintiff wishes to sue the defendant 
manufacturer to recover money damages for his personal injuries and for 
his destroyed property.  Under the relevant substantive law, the plaintiff 
may seek damages on several theories of recovery including breach of
contract, breach of express and implied warranties, negligence, fraud, 
and strict products liability. Must plaintiff pursue all these theories of 
recovery in one lawsuit, or will the plaintiff be permitted to bring them 
in more than one action? 
Under the Restatement standard the answer is reasonably clear.  The 
plaintiff must allege all rights to remedies against the defendant 
manufacturer arising from the “transaction, or series of connected
transactions,” in one lawsuit. Accordingly, the plaintiff must seek
damages for all his personal and property injuries relating to the
exploding water heater, and must present all substantive theories of
recovery in one lawsuit.  Any such right to relief not raised will be 
barred by the judgment in the first action.  By contrast, under the 
California doctrine, whether the plaintiff must raise all rights to relief in 
one lawsuit will not depend solely on whether they arise from the same 
transaction, but rather on whether the defendant’s alleged misconduct 
invades one or more primary rights. If, for example, the injury to the 
plaintiff’s person violates a different primary right than the injury to the
plaintiff’s property, the plaintiff may bring each such cause of action 
against the defendant manufacturer in a separate lawsuit.  Likewise, if
the injury to the plaintiff’s real property violates a different primary right
than the injury to her personal property, she may have the option of three 
lawsuits. Moreover, if injuries caused by the defendant’s breach of 
contract constitutes a separate primary right than injuries due to tortious 
misconduct, the plaintiff may have four (or more) causes of action and 
hence the option of (at least) four lawsuits!  The fact that the plaintiff’s
rights to relief arose from the a single factual transaction or 
occurrence—the water heater explosion—is not determinative.26 
26. A typical car crash case provides another example of the difference between 
the primary rights and the transactional approaches to claim preclusion.  Assume that
defendant’s car collides with plaintiff’s car on the freeway.  Both parties were seriously
injured, and their respective vehicles were destroyed.  Plaintiff wishes to recover
damages for the injuries to his person and property caused by the defendant’s negligence.  
Must the plaintiff pursue his claims for personal injuries and property damages in one 
lawsuit, or will he be permitted to pursue them in more than one action?  Under 
established California primary rights precedent, the defendant’s wrongful act invaded 
568
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By adhering to the primary rights theory, the California Supreme 
Court has not adopted the Restatement’s transactional standard.27 
Nevertheless, the court has implicitly  incorporated a transactional 
notion as part of the California claim preclusion analysis.  For example,
although a plaintiff may have suffered the same type of harm on two 
occasions as the result of defendant’s misconduct, the plaintiff will have 
two causes of action if the harm arose from two separate transactions.28 
Therefore, the California transactional approach, as a basis for finding 
that an injury was not part of the same cause of action because it was
caused by a different transaction, has been used solely in an exclusive or 
negative manner.29  The approach is not used in an inclusive or positive
two of plaintiff’s primary rights—the rights to be free from tortious injury to person and 
to property. Plaintiff therefore has two causes of action against the defendant, and may
pursue them in two separate lawsuits. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45 and 55­
59. 
Under the RESTATEMENT approach, the plaintiff must pursue all rights to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to the factual transaction—the car crash—in one
lawsuit.  Plaintiff therefore must seek recovery for injuries to his person and his car in 
one lawsuit; the doctrines of merger and bar prevent him from maintaining separate
actions for the injuries to his person and to his property. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §
24 cmt. c, illus. 1. 
27. The vast majority of states have adopted the RESTATEMENT’s transactional
approach to claim preclusion as their res judicata doctrine. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 
11, § 24, apps. 4 (1988) & 5 (1996). See also James, supra note 8, at 353 n.11 & 408 n.542 
(indicating that at most nine states, including California, do not follow the transactional
standard as their claim preclusion doctrine).
28. See, e.g., Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 371
P.2d 758, 761-62 (Cal. 1962) (holding that a prior agency decision in 1953 refusing to
revoke the plaintiff store’s liquor license did not bar the agency’s second revocation
proceeding because the second proceeding was based on events occurring after 1953, rather
than the events referred to in the earlier proceeding); Frommhagen v. Board of Supervisors,
243 Cal. Rptr. 390, 394 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff’s suit challenging the
defendant county’s calculation of service charges for fiscal year 1985-1986 was not barred 
by the plaintiff’s prior action which unsuccessfully challenged the calculation for 1984-1985
and stating that “[i]n the parlance of the ‘primary right theory,’ those paying charges have a
primary right to have the charges properly calculated and imposed each year”); Zingheim v.
Marshall, 57 Cal. Rptr. 809, 813-14 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the plaintiff, who had
already recovered accrued monthly payments due under an installment sales contract, was 
not barred from seeking recovery of unpaid installments accruing subsequent to the prior
judgment); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1047 (Deering 1996) (providing that “[s]uccessive
actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction, whenever, after the former
action, a new cause of action arises therefrom”).
29. See authorities cited supra note 28; see also Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 118
P. 425, 428 (Cal. 1911) (noting that a continuous breach of contract by a defendant who has 
a continuous duty to perform gives rise to a new cause of action for as long as the breach
continues); Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 72-73 (Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that plaintiff’s sex discrimination cause of action was not barred by prior judgment
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manner as a basis for finding that the cause of action alleged is the same
as alleged in a prior lawsuit because they both arose from the same
transaction or occurrence.
Under both the California doctrine and the Restatement, a claim is
never broader than the transaction to which it relates.30  Both view the  
transaction as marking the outer limits of the claim—a judgment in a 
prior action does not preclude a second action unless both actions
derived from the same transaction.31  But unlike the Restatement’s use of 
“transaction,” the California primary rights approach does not make a 
cause of action coterminous with the transaction itself.  A unitary
transaction or occurrence, under the California doctrine, gives rise to
more than one cause of action if it violates more than one primary
right.32  By contrast, under the Restatement view, a unitary transaction or 
occurrence by definition constitutes a single claim.33 
The California and Restatement doctrines both make the definition of
“cause of action” (or “claim”) of central importance.  The Restatement
defines “claim” by a black-letter formulation of the transactional 
standard, and then provides guidance for application of this standard 
through numerous comments and illustrations.  The Restatement’s
extensive explanations largely eliminate any ambiguities in the 
application of the transactional standard.  By contrast, the California 
Supreme Court defines a “cause of action” by utilizing the primary
rights theory.  Under this theory, the invasion of one primary right gives 
rise to a single cause of action.34  The key to the California doctrine, 
therefore, is the definition of “primary right.”  Problems with the 
California doctrine begin to materialize even at this definitional level. 
Unlike the Restatement, the court-made primary rights doctrine contains 
which found plaintiff’s termination not wrongful because instant action alleges 
discriminatory conduct that arguably occurred before and was not necessarily part of her 
termination from employment).
30. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24, cmt. a; see, e.g., Louis Stores, Inc., 371 P.2d 
at 762; Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 197 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615-16 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing cases
for the proposition that a judgment does not bar subsequent lawsuits based on illegal conduct
by the defendant occurring after the date of the judgment); see also, e.g., authorities cited 
supra note 28.
31. See authorities cited supra note 28.
32. See, e.g., Holmes v. David H. Brickner, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 649 (Cal. 1969)
(endorsing the view that a single tortious act causing injury to person and to property
constitutes violations of two primary rights and therefore creates two causes of action);
Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979) (ruling that different primary rights may be 
violated by the same wrongful conduct).  Professor Pomeroy emphasized this point in his 
treatise defining the primary rights theory: “[t]he same primary right may be broken by
many kinds of wrong-doing; and the same wrongful act or default may invade many
different rights.”  J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 91, at 103 (4th ed. 1918).
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24, cmt. a.
34. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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few explanations or illustrations to guide litigants and courts. 
Consequently, the key to predictability under the California doctrine is a 
clear judicial statement of the boundaries of a primary right. 
Unfortunately, unlike the Restatement, the only sources of explanations 
are vague treatises and erratic court decisions. 
B. The Primary Rights Theory—Living History 
The primary rights theory was developed by Professor John Norton 
Pomeroy35 in the nineteenth century, and adopted by the California 
Supreme Court as early as 1887.36  Under the primary rights theory
advanced by Pomeroy, a “cause of action” consists of a “primary right” 
possessed by the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the 
defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of 
that duty.37 
35. John Norton Pomeroy (1828-1885) was a professor at the Hastings College of
Law during the nineteenth century and a prolific legal scholar.  In addition to his influential
multi-volume treatise on equity jurisprudence and equitable remedies, in which he explained
at length the primary rights theory of a cause of action; Professor Pomeroy also published 
treatises on a wide variety of topics, including the civil procedure in California and other
states, code pleading and remedies, constitutional law, municipal law, wills and trusts, and
western water law. See infra notes 37, 45, and 55. 
36. See Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 15 P. 82, 84 (Cal. 1887) (citing Pomeroy and 
holding that the facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to sue was based, and upon which the
defendant’s duty had arisen, coupled with the facts that made up the defendant’s wrong,
constituted a cause of action); see also McCarty v. Fremont, 23 Cal. 196 (1863) (holding that
the plaintiff was not permitted to plead causes of action for injury to person, injury to real
property, and injury to personal property in one complaint because of clear violations of the
Practice Act’s permissive joinder restrictions); McKee v. Dodd, 93 P. 854, 855 (Cal. 1908)
(referring to Pomeroy for the proposition that a primary right and a duty combined constitute
the cause of action for purposes of pleading).
37. See Crowley v. Katleman 881 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Cal. 1994); see also J.
POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS, § 453, at 487 (1876) [hereinafter POMEROY,
REMEDIES]; J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 89-95, at 75-79 (1881) [hereinafter
POMEROY, EQUITY]. Professor Pomeroy observed that although the American courts had 
repeatedly distinguished a cause of action from the relief demanded in a case before 
them, “they have not attempted to define the term ‘cause of action’ in any general and 
abstract manner, so that this definition might be used as a test in all other cases.”
POMEROY, REMEDIES, § 452, at 486. Pomeroy then undertook to define the correct 
meaning of the term cause of action, apparently relying on natural law concepts. Id. at
486-487. 
Professor Pomeroy also undertook the onerous task of identifying all the rules which
constitute “private civil law” and assigning them to mutually exclusive classes of 
primary rights and duties. POMEROY, EQUITY §§ 89-95, at 119-24.  According to 
Pomeroy, all such rights fell naturally into two grand divisions: those relating to
“Persons” and those concerned with “Things.” Id. at 121. The first of these divisions 
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Although the genesis of the primary rights theory is found in 
Pomeroy’s writings, the historical evolution of the primary rights theory
is intertwined with California’s nineteenth century pleading and joinder 
rules.38  The primary rights theory was first reflected in the permissive 
joinder of claims provisions of the California Practice Act of 1851.39 
This 1851 Act, which was later codified in former Section 427 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure, divided all claims into seven
specific categories.40  Claims falling within separate categories could not 
comprised “only those rules the exclusive object of which is to define the status of 
persons.” Id.
Pomeroy separated the grand division of “Things” into two principal classes—“Real 
rights” and “Personal rights.” Id. at 122-24.  Real rights embraced three distinct
subclasses: 
1. Rights of property of every degree and kind over land and chattels, things 
real and things personal; 2.  The rights which every person has over and to his 
own life, body, limbs, and good name; 3. The rights which certain classes of
persons, namely husbands, parents, and masters, have over certain other 
persons standing in domestic relations with themselves, namely, wives, 
children, and servants and slaves.
Id. at 122-23. 
The second class, “Personal rights,” included two subclasses: “1.  Rights arising from 
contract;” and 2. Quasi contract and fiduciary rights arising  “from some existing relation
between two specific persons or groups of persons, which is generally created by law.” 
Id. at 123. 
Pomeroy viewed these general classifications as embracing “all primary rights and 
duties, both legal and equitable, which belong to the private civil law.” Id. at 124. 
38. See James, supra note 8, at 372-385; Holmes v. David H. Brickner, Inc., 452 P.2d
647, 649 (Cal. 1969). The restrictive claim joinder statutes were in effect when Pomeroy
published his treatises defining the primary rights theory.  See generally James, supra note 
8, at 359-360; POMEROY, EQUITY, supra note 37; POMEROY, REMEDIES, supra note 37. 
Indeed, Pomeroy’s entire REMEDIES treatise is devoted to analyses of the Field Code as
adopted in New York and by several other states, including California. Id. §§ 28-43, at 27-45 
(discussing the reformed American system of procedure under the codes of civil procedure).
More specifically, in his discussion of joinder of causes of action, Pomeroy analyzed the
permissive joinder provisions of the codes as adopted in several states. Id. §§ 438-441, at
476-479. Pomeroy specifically referred to the California statute, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 427 (1872), which he then quoted in a footnote.  POMEROY, REMEDIES, supra note 37, § 
439, at 477 n. 3.  Pomeroy linked his extensive analysis of misjoinder of causes of action to
his attempt to ascertain the true meaning of the term “cause of action,” and discussed both
concepts expressly in the context of the restrictive categories of permissibly joinable claims
under the various state codes. Id. §§ 442-505, at 479-533.
39. Law of April 29, 1851, ch. 123, tit. 4, § 64, 1850-53 CAL. STAT. 519, 529, codified 
by CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427 but repealed by Act of July 1, 1972, ch. 244, § 23, 1971 
CAL. STAT. 378.  The Act of 1851 was based on the original Field Code. See Holmes, 452 
P.2d 647; see also James, supra note 8, at 380; Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims,
Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1970); J. H. Toelle, Joinder of Actions—With Reference to the Montana
and California Practice, 18 CAL. L. REV. 459, 465 (1930).
40. The original version of former Section 427 (enacted in 1872) codified without 
change the permissive joinder provisions of the 1851 Act, and provided as follows: 
The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when
they all arise out of:
572
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be joined in the same complaint, and therefore had to be pleaded in
separate actions.  For example, the original version of Section 427 
permitted a plaintiff to join all claims for injuries to her person against a 
defendant in one complaint, or certain claims for injuries to her property, 
but prohibited plaintiff from pursuing both her personal injury and
property damage claims in one lawsuit.41 
Viewed in this historical context, Pomeroy’s primary rights theory
made sense when adopted by the courts in the nineteenth century.42  If,  
for example, the joinder rules prohibited a plaintiff from pleading claims 
for tortious injury to person and to property against a defendant in one 
lawsuit, a personal injury judgment in the first lawsuit should not 
extinguish plaintiff’s claims for property damages in a second action.43 
Such a claim preclusive effect would have been fundamentally unfair to
the plaintiff, particularly one who had established the defendant’s 
liability in the first action.  Moreover, issue preclusion was available to
minimize any unfairness to a defendant who had successfully defended
against liability in the first lawsuit.44 
1. 	  Contracts, express or implied; or, 
2.	 Claims to recover specific real property, with or without damages, 
for the withholding thereof, or for waste committed thereon, and the 
  rents and profits of the same; or, 
3.	 Claims to recover specific personal property, with or without 
  damages, for the withholding thereof; or, 
4.	 Claims against a trustee, by virtue of contract, or by operation of 
  law; or,
5. 	 Injuries to character; or,
6.	 Injuries to person; or, 
7.	 Injuries to property. 
But the causes of action so united shall all belong to only one of these 
classes, and shall affect all parties to the action, and not require different places 
of trial, and shall be separately stated. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427, repealed by Act of July 1, 1972, ch. 244, § 23, 1971 CAL.
STAT. 378.
41. Id.
42. Pomeroy’s classification  of “primary” rights were similar, although not identical,
to former § 427’s categories of permissibly joinable claims.  See infra note 45.
 43. The court in Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 123 P. 351 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1912), one of the few appellate decisions to consider this question in the context of a
res judicata determination, employed precisely this reasoning in a simple car crash case.  The
court held that a prior judgment for property damage did not preclude plaintiff’s instant suit
for personal injuries, although caused by the same negligent act of the defendant.  The court
reasoned that the second suit was not barred because, under former § 427, the plaintiff could
not have sought recovery for injuries to person and injuries to property in one action. Id. at
352.
 44. In Todhunter v. Smith, 28 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1934), for example, the court held that
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Over time, the California courts viewed the categories of permissibly 
joinable claims designated in the original version of former Section 427 
as synonymous with Pomeroy’s classifications of primary rights.45 
However, through frequent amendments between 1907 and 1931, the 
Legislature attempted to liberalize the restrictive categories of former
Section 427.  Although many were poorly drafted and their meaning 
unclear, these revisions significantly modified the seven categories of
the original Section 427.46 For example, a 1915 amendment permitted a 
although res judicata did not completely bar the plaintiff’s second action to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision with the defendant, a prior
judgment whereby plaintiff unsuccessfully sought recovery for damage to his car collaterally
estopped the plaintiff from relitigating the issue of negligence.
45. Pomeroy’s classification of rights that are primary did not completely coincide
with the statutory categories designated in the original version of § 427. Pomeroy did not 
distinguish between rights granted in real and personal properties. See  POMEROY, 
EQUITY, supra note 37, § 94, at 78. Under Pomeroy’s classification all “[r]ights of 
property of every degree and kind over land or chattels, things real or things personal” 
constituted one primary right. Id. Former § 427, by contrast, assigned claims to recover
specific real property and claims to recover specific personal property to separate 
categories. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427(2)-(3) (repealed 1971).  Consequently, 
although Pomeroy viewed injury to real and personal property as a violation of one 
primary right and creating one cause of action, former § 427 did not permit joinder of 
both types of property claims in one lawsuit. See James, supra note 8, at 360; Holmes v. 
David H. Brickner, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 649 (Cal. 1969).  Pomeroy also classified the
“rights which every person has over and to his own life, body, limbs, and good name” as 
of the same essential nature, and therefore as constituting one primary right. POMEROY,
EQUITY, supra note 37, § 94, at 78.  By contrast, former § 427 assigned “[i]njuries to
character” and “[i]njuries to person” to separate categories, and thereby prohibited
joinder of both such claims in one complaint. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427(5)-(6)
(repealed 1971). 
Because of such differences, it is not surprising that the courts defined primary rights 
by reference to former § 427 rather than to Pomeroy’s writings.  If the courts had 
adhered to Pomeroy’s primary rights classifications instead of the categories designated
in former § 427, certain res judicata applications would have been fundamentally unfair 
to a plaintiff.  Under former § 427’s joinder restrictions, for example, a plaintiff could 
not seek recovery for injuries to real and to personal properties in one lawsuit, even 
though caused by the same wrongful act of the defendant.  However, if the plaintiff
elected to pursue recoveries in two lawsuits, the plaintiff would be splitting a single 
cause of action according to Pomeroy’s primary rights theory.  Consequently, under 
Pomeroy’s view the first suit to produce a final judgment, even one favorable to the
plaintiff, would be res judicata as to the second suit.  The same unfairness to the plaintiff 
would occur where a defendant’s tortious act injured both plaintiff’s person and 
reputation.
46. In 1907, for example, the Legislature added a new eighth category to former § 427 
which provided for permissive joinder of “claims ‘arising out of the same transaction, or
transactions connected with the same subject of action, and not included within one of the
foregoing subdivisions of this section.’” Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 3. The meaning of this
new category was unclear from the outset. Id. The wording of this eighth category seemed
to preclude joinder of any claim that fell within one of the first seven statutory categories of 
claims even if it arose out of the same transaction as the claim with which it was to be
joined. Id.  Since the first seven categories covered almost all possible causes of action, the
utility of the new eighth was limited. Id.
574
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plaintiff to join in the same complaint “causes of action for injuries to
persons and injuries to property, growing out of the same tort . . . .”47 
This provision, along with several other revisions which remained in 
effect until the repeal of former Section 427 in 1971, meant that the 
statutory categories were no longer the same as Pomeroy’s primary
rights classifications. Consequently, the California Supreme Court
sought to identify some unifying themes to assist the lower courts in 
applying the primary rights theory in cases where plaintiff’s claims did
not fall neatly into one of former Section 427’s categories.  This effort
proved largely unenlightening.  The best the court could do was to 
emphasize that a judgment in a prior action was a bar to a subsequent 
action based on the “same injuries,” even though the second action
raised new theories of recovery or requested new forms of relief.48 
Other than to continue to refer to the original version of former Section
427, the court did little to generally define what constituted the “same” 
as opposed to “different” injuries.  Eventually, with the repeal of former 
Section 427, the court’s explicit reliance on this joinder statute as an aid
to defining primary rights came to an end.49 
Effective 1972, the California Legislature repealed Section 427 and
replaced it with a modern joinder of claims statute.  Recognizing that the 
former permissive joinder categories were arbitrary and inefficient, the
Legislature eliminated such restrictions in favor of a standard which
permits a plaintiff to join together any causes of action which she has 
47. Act of April 10, 1915, ch. 28, sec. 1, § 427, 1915 CAL. STAT. 30 codified at CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 427(8) repealed by Act of July 1, 1972, ch. 244, § 23, 1971 CAL. STAT. 
378.
 48. In Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 594-95 (Cal. 1975), the court ruled that a
“‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular [legal] theory
asserted by the litigant,” and therefore a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent
action by the plaintiff based on the “same injury” to the same right, even though plaintiff
presents a different legal ground for relief. See also Busick v. Workmen’s Compensation 
Appeals Bd., 500 P.2d 1386, 1390 (Cal. 1972) (observing that there is but one cause of
action for one personal injury caused by reason of one wrongful act, even though mutually
exclusive remedies are available to the plaintiffs); Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d
242, 244 (Cal. 1943) (holding that prior judgment was a bar to prosecution of the instant
action against the same defendant for the same injuries, even though the instant action was 
based on negligence grounds not previously known to the plaintiff).
49. In defining primary rights, California courts continued to refer to the original
version of former § 427. See, e.g., Holmes, 452 P.2d at 649 n.2 (quoting the 1851 Act).  The
Legislature had, in fact, amended § 427 on several occasions, and had somewhat altered the
categories of claims that could be joined in a complaint. See supra text accompanying notes
46-47.
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against a defendant.50  This unlimited joinder of claims standard, 
codified at Section 427.10(a), remains in effect today.51  With the
adoption of the unrestricted joinder of claims, the link between claim 
joinder and res judicata—the historical and philosophical justification 
for the primary rights theory—was now completely severed.  The 
challenge for the California Supreme Court was whether, and if so how, 
to reformulate the court-made res judicata doctrine in response to this 
legislative change. To date, on the few occasions it has had to expound
on the doctrine, the court has taken a cautious approach.  The courts of 
appeal have been more adventuresome, but this effort has resulted in
inconsistent and, therefore, less predictable results. 
C. Modern Judicial Interpretations of Claim Preclusion 
1.	 The California Supreme Court Provides Unclear Guidance Through 
Its “Harm Suffered” Approach 
After 1971, the California Supreme Court has continued to apply the
primary rights theory as the basis of California’s res judicata doctrine. 
The court no longer refers to former Section 427, now repealed, but has 
not yet renounced its categorical scheme.  In current res judicata
determinations, the court typically defines a primary right by reference 
to the “harm suffered,” as opposed to the particular theory of recovery
asserted or remedy sought by the litigant.52  A cause of action is
conceived as the remedial right in favor of a plaintiff for the violation of
one primary right.  Even where there are multiple legal theories upon 
which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to one cause
of action.53  The fact that several remedies may be available for the
violation of one primary right does not create additional causes of action.  
50. Act of July 1, 1972, ch. 244, sec. 23, § 427, 1971 CAL. STAT. 380.  The California
Law Revision Commission had viewed the restricted permissive joinder of claims provisions
of former § 427 as undesirable, and recommended the adoption of unlimited joinder as a
significant improvement in California procedural law. See 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N 
REP. 501, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION RELATING TO
COUNTERCLAIMS AND CROSS-COMPLAINTS, JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION AND RELATED
PROVISIONS, at 510 (1970). The legislative committee comment to new § 427.10 noted that
it superseded former § 427 and “eliminates the arbitrary categories set forth in that section.”
REPORT OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY ON SENATE BILL NO. 201, J. SENATE at 887 (Cal. 
April 1, 1971).
51. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 427.10(a) (Deering 1995) (providing that “[a] plaintiff
who in a complaint, alone or with coplaintiffs, alleges a cause of action against one or more
defendants may unite with such cause any other causes which he has either alone or with any
coplaintiffs against any such defendants”). 
52. See, e.g., Slater, 543 P.2d at 594.
53. See id.
576
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However, it is also true that a single wrongful act by a defendant may
invade more than one primary right and, therefore, create more than one 
cause of action.54  Unlike the Restatement’s transactional approach, a
unitary occurrence may give rise to two causes of action and thereby
permit the plaintiff to maintain two separate lawsuits against the same 
defendant. 
By focusing on the “harm suffered” by the plaintiff, the primary rights
theory presents a somewhat ambiguous but potentially workable test for
determining whether a defendant’s conduct creates one or more causes
of action. Although definitions of which categories of harms are 
“primary” harms requires some judicial interpretation, such broad 
classifications would not be difficult to make.  For example, personal
injury could be classified as distinct from injury to property, and injury 
to real property as distinct from injury to personal property.55  Although 
Pomeroy’s abstractly stated primary rights theory may be inherently 
ambiguous, such ambiguity is not a fatal flaw in the doctrine.  A few 
judicially-created, general classifications of harm could make the
doctrine relatively easy to apply in most cases.56  How a particular harm
54. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 603 P.2d 58, 72 (Cal. 1979); Branson v. Sun-
Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 322 (Ct. App. 1994); Sawyer v. First City Fin.
Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (Ct. App. 1981).
55. These very distinctions have been made by the Court of Appeal in two cases. 
In Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 123 P. 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912), the 
court held that a prior judgment for property damage did not bar a second action for 
personal injuries, although caused by the same negligent act of the defendant. Id. at 352. 
However, the Schermerhorn opinion does not mention either Pomeroy or the primary
rights theory, but relied on former § 427. In McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1954), the court ruled that plaintiff’s prior action for recovery of possession of real 
property involved a different primary right than the instant action to recover damages for 
wrongful detention of personal property located on the real property. Id. at 94-97. 
Pomeroy did not have precisely these broad divisions in mind when he advanced his 
primary rights theory. See  POMEROY, EQUITY, supra note 37, §§ 89-95, at 75-79. 
Pomeroy did classify injury to person as a separate primary right from injury to property,
but did not distinguish between injury to real and personal property. See supra note 45.
Moreover, Pomeroy classified all rights arising from a contract—which he referred to as 
“personal rights”—as a primary right distinct from all other primary rights, and did not 
further limit this class of “personal rights” by the nature of the injury sought to be 
remedied. See  POMEROY, EQUITY, supra note 37, § 95, at 79. Presumably, under 
Pomeroy’s view, a contract breach which caused injuries to both person and property
violated only one primary right and constituted only one cause of action.  Less clear is 
how Pomeroy would have classified a wrongful act which caused personal injury and 
which, under the applicable substantive law, constituted both a tort (e.g., negligence) and 
a breach of contract (e.g., breach of warranty).
56. In an excellent student note, James, supra note 8, at 387-402, the author argues
that the primary rights theory is inherently ambiguous. Although this observation is accurate,
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is classified may be somewhat arbitrary at times, but certainly clear
distinctions are possible.57  Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court
has not developed clear guidelines for the classification of harms
required for the purpose of primary rights distinctions.
Prior to 1972, judicial classification of which harms constituted 
separate primary rights had not been a total failure.  The lower appellate
courts recognized injury to one’s person as distinct from injury to one’s 
property, and classified each such harm as a violation of a separate 
primary right.58  The California Supreme Court never directly endorsed
this general primary rights classification until its 1969 opinion in 
Holmes v. David H. Brickner, Inc.,59 but did so then in a manner that 
actually clouded the utility of the personal injury/property injury
distinction.60 
the real problem with the administration of the primary rights doctrine is the failure of the
California courts to make general distinctions among categories of harms. Instead, as will be
discussed later, the courts have not always focused on the harm suffered in determining
whether one or more primary rights have been violated. See infra notes 59-63 and 75-83 and
accompanying text.
57. Of course, when compared to the RESTATEMENT’s transactional approach, the
primary rights doctrine is less effective in achieving the substantive economy goal of res 
judicata, that is, to preclude parties from pursuing multiple lawsuits to resolve controversies 
which could have been fully and fairly resolved in one proceeding. See supra text 
accompanying notes 22-33.  But, with proper judicial classification of “harms,” the primary
rights theory could provide claim preclusion guidelines as clear and as predictable as those
of the RESTATEMENT. 
58. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. Los Angeles Pac. R.R. Co., 123 P. 351 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1912); Arlo E. Smith, Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CAL. L. REV. 412, 
416 (1952) (citing cases); cf. Weisshand v. City of Petaluma, 174 P. 955, 957 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1918) (applying this distinction when construing permissive joinder of claims 
statute). The courts further construed “injury to person” to include all personal injuries 
arising from a defendant’s tortious conduct. See cases cited infra notes 70-71.  A
defendant’s negligent act, for example, which injures a plaintiff’s limbs and head, and
causes consequential injuries such as emotional distress and loss of work, violates only
one primary right. See cases cited infra notes 67, 70. 
One court of appeal decision, McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954), also
recognized another general classification. See supra note 55. The McNulty court ruled
that injury to real property involved a different primary right than injury to personal
property, where both injuries were caused by the defendant’s same wrongful conduct. Id.
at 97-98. 
59. 452 P.2d 647 (Cal. 1969).  Prior to its Holmes opinion, the California Supreme
Court had simply assumed, usually in the context of a misjoinder of claims discussion, that a
defendant’s single wrongful act injuring a plaintiff’s person and property violated two 
primary rights and therefore created two causes of action. See, e.g., Todhunter v. Smith, 28
P.2d 916, 918 (Cal. 1934) (dicta); Bowman v. Wohlke, 135 P. 37, 39 (Cal. 1913) (holding
that under former section 427 causes of action for injuries to property and to person could
not be united in one lawsuit); Lamb v. Harbaugh, 39 P. 56, 57 (Cal. 1895) (ruling that
allegations of injuries to person and property constituted two distinct causes of action which
were misjoined in complaint); Thelin v, Stewart, 34 P. 861, 862 (Cal. 1893) (holding that
causes of action for injury to property and to person could not be joined, under former
section 427, in one complaint).
60. In Holmes, the California Supreme Court specifically endorsed, in dicta, the
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The plaintiffs in Holmes had purchased a used automobile from the
defendant dealer. The contract of sale contained an express warranty 
that the used car was in good working condition.  Less than one month 
later, the plaintiffs’ car crashed causing personal injury to the plaintiffs 
and damage to their car. Plaintiffs’ initially sued the defendant to 
recover damages for their personal injuries caused by defective brakes.
Their complaint alleged breach of express and implied warranties,
negligence, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  The plaintiffs obtained a 
sizable money judgment.  Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a second 
action against the defendant to recover damages to their automobile,
again alleging breach of express warranty.  The trial court sustained the 
defendant’s demurrer to the plaintiffs’ complaint and dismissed their 
action as barred by res judicata.  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that 
injuries to property and to person constituted two separate causes of 
action which could be asserted in two separate lawsuits, citing 
established primary rights precedent.  The California Supreme Court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs and upheld the dismissal. The court
acknowledged its prior decisions that causes of action for injuries to 
persons and property are separate, but held that those prior decisions 
involved tortious injury to persons and property.  The court then noted 
that the plaintiffs’ present complaint, which alleged breach of warranty,
was essentially contractual in nature, and as such was identical to the
breach of warranty alleged in the prior personal injury action.  The court
then concluded that the judgment in the prior action barred the second 
action because “[u]nder these circumstances the applicable rule is that all
damages for a single breach of contract must be recovered in one
action.”61  The court offered no additional explanation for its holding.62 
general distinction that causes of action for injuries to person and to property are separate.
Holmes, 452 P.2d at 649.  Ironically, the Holmes court then limited this distinction to
tortious injury to person and property, and declined to extend it to a contractual injuries. See 
infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
61. Holmes, 452 P.2d at 650.
 62. The Holmes court did, however, discuss the primary rights theory with reference
to the permissive joinder provisions of the 1851 Practice Act, the original version of § 427,
which it quoted in a footnote. Id. at 649 n.2. The joinder provisions of the 1851 Act, the
court observed, reflected the settled primary rights rule that “conduct that simultaneously
causes harm both to the person and to the property of one individual gives rise to two
separate and distinct causes of action, one for . . . interference with the integrity of the person
and one for violation of the right to quiet enjoyment of property.”  Id. at 649. The court then
reasoned that this “settled rule” was limited to tortious injury to person and property. The 
applicable rule to the instant case, the court ruled, was that all damages for a single breach of 
contract must be recovered in one action. Id. at 650.
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Holmes represents a missed opportunity to provide a clear, general
classification of primary rights.  The Holmes court could have broadly
defined all actions for personal injuries as a primary rights category
separate from all actions for property damages, but choose not to do so. 
Instead, the Holmes decision added ambiguity to the “harmed suffered”
method of determining primary rights.  Injury to one’s person was not 
necessarily (or always) a separate primary right from injury to one’s
property—only where the injuries were caused by the defendant’s 
tortious act and not by breach of contract. Despite general
pronouncements to the contrary, the nature of the “harm suffered” did 
not ultimately determine whether the defendant’s wrongful act violated 
more than one primary right.  The theory of the defendant’s alleged
liability was more determinative.63  Not surprisingly, many of the current
difficulties with California’s primary rights analysis may be traced to the 
Holmes decision.
In its 1979 decision in Agarwal v. Johnson,64 the California Supreme 
Court further compromised the “harm suffered” test. The plaintiff in 
Agarwal was terminated from his employment with the defendant
construction company for insubordination.  Prior to his termination, the 
plaintiff’s supervisor used racial epithets to humiliate the plaintiff, and 
ultimately recommended his termination for reasons that were not true.65 
The plaintiff was not able to find work for 13 months thereafter, in part 
because of unfavorable statements made by defendant about him to 
prospective employers.  The plaintiff suffered extreme emotional 
distress at the time of his termination, which he believed was motivated 
by racial discrimination, and sued the defendant company in state court 
seeking damages for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. He also filed a second action against the defendant in federal
court, this time seeking back pay and injunctive relief pursuant to Title
VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The plaintiff’s federal 
action was based on the same underlying facts as the state court action, 
but it also alleged racially discriminatory employment practices by the
63. One way to conceptualize Holmes is that the court based its holding on the manner
by which the defendant caused the plaintiff to suffer harm, as opposed to the nature of the 
harm suffered.  Holmes indicates that all harm suffered due to a breach of contract
constitutes one primary right and therefore one cause of action, and that contract injury is 
somehow distinguished from tort injury for primary rights purposes.  This distinction 
appears totally arbitrary, and provides no logical basis for treating all contract injuries as
creating one cause of action but not treating all tort injuries as creating one cause of action.
This distinction does make sense, however, when viewed as a reflection of the permissive
joinder categories of former § 427. See supra note 40. Likewise, this distinction is consistent
with Pomeroy’s abstract classifications of primary rights. See supra notes 37, 45, and 55. 
64. 603 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1979).
65. Id. at 64-65.
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defendant. The federal court concluded that the defendant’s employ­
ment practices were not racially discriminatory, and that the defendant 
had not engaged in race discrimination when it terminated the plaintiff.66 
The defendant in Agarwal then moved the state court to dismiss 
plaintiff’s action as barred by res judicata.  The defendant argued that
the prior federal judgment was based on the same operative facts as the 
state action and involved the same cause of action.  The California 
Supreme Court did not agree. The court observed “that the same facts
are involved in both suits is not conclusive.”67  In addition, the court also 
stated that under the primary rights theory “the significant factor is the
harm suffered. . . .”68  The plaintiff’s federal action, according to the
court, sought monetary damages only for the harm caused by the 
defendant’s alleged employment discrimination which, under Title VII, 
was limited to back pay.  In contrast, the plaintiff’s state court action
sought damages to redress an entirely different harm—defamation and 
emotional distress.  The court recognized that the state court claims
“arose in conjunction with the alleged violation of Title VII,” but held 
that the state court action sought “damages for harm distinct from
employment discrimination.”69 
The Agarwal decision is difficult to reconcile with the “harm
suffered” approach. The court apparently viewed the defendant’s act of
firing the plaintiff as subjecting him to two distinct categories of injury. 
In a narrow factual sense, the Agarwal court is probably correct—the
harm of lost wages is different than the harm of emotional distress.  But
from a conceptual viewpoint, the court’s primary rights analysis is
66. Prior to the federal district court’s decision, a superior court jury in the state
lawsuit had already returned a verdict for plaintiff Agarwal in the amount of $62,400 on the
state law defamation and emotional distress allegations, and defendant appealed.  While the
state court appeal was pending before the California Court of Appeal, the federal district
court entered its judgment finding defendant’s treatment of plaintiff did not constitute
employment discrimination under federal Title VII.  Defendant then moved the state
appellate court for a determination that the state court action was now barred by res judicata.
Id. at 71.  Defendant’s motion took advantage of the federal rule under which a judgment 
once rendered is final for purposes of res judicata until reversed on appeal, modified or set
aside in the court of rendition. Id. at 72 n.11. See also Calhoun v. Franchise Tax Bd., 574 
P.2d 763, 766 (Cal. 1978).  Under the California rule the superior court judgment, although
entered before the federal one, was not final for purpose of res judicata during the pendency
of and until resolution of the appeal. Argawal, 603 P.2d at 72 n.11; see Wood v. Herson, 114 
Cal. Rptr. 365, 371 (Ct. App. 1974); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1049 (Deering 1996).















    
 




   
 

















troublesome.  Both lawsuits focused on the same conduct of the 
defendant which culminated in the plaintiff’s termination.  Although the
court correctly reasoned that a unitary occurrence may violate more than
one primary right, the court offers no explanation as to why these two
categories of personal injuries are so different as to constitute two 
primary rights.  Moreover, prior to Agarwal, the general rule was that 
where a defendant’s tortious act caused multiple personal injuries to a 
plaintiff, such as missing work and suffering physical and emotional 
injuries, the primary rights doctrine required the plaintiff to seek redress
for all her personal injuries in one lawsuit.70  Consequential injuries 
caused by a defendant’s tortious act did not constitute a second cause of 
action.71  The Agarwal court seems to have rejected this general rule, but
it has provided no explanation as to why the plaintiff’s consequential 
injuries were so different from his previous injury that they constituted a 
separate cause of action. 
Agarwal is the last California Supreme Court decision to directly rule
on the definition of a cause of action, and therefore of a primary right,
for the purpose of a res judicata determination.72  The court in two recent 
70. The longstanding rule in California has been that “[a] single tort can be the 
foundation for but one claim for damages.” Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242
(Cal. 1943); see, e.g., Hall v. Susskind, 41 P. 1012, 1014 (Cal. 1895) (ruling that all damages 
arising from a single wrong, although at different times, make but one cause of action);
Savage v. Emery, 63 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the plaintiff may not
split a single tort cause of action, and therefore a second suit for damages was barred by res 
judicata, even though the plaintiff was not aware of the particular elements of damages, now 
sought, at the time of the prior action); DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375-76 (Ct. 
App. 1987); cf. Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320 (Cal. 1896); Landeros v. Flood,
551 P.2d 389, 396 (Cal. 1976).
71. See, e.g., Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 68 (Ct. App.
1992) (holding that res judicata effect of prior mandamus action barred plaintiff’s instant
action to recover emotional distress damages caused by alleged wrongful termination
because “[c]onsequential damages do not support a separate cause of action”); Takahashi v. 
Board of Educ. of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (Ct. App. 1988)
(ruling that plaintiff’s wrongful termination suit alleged an infringement of only one primary
right although plaintiff sought lost wages and emotional distress damages based on wrongful
discharge and employment discrimination); cf. Wood v. Currey, 57 Cal. 208, 210 (1881)
(holding that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, subsequent damages which result
from a tort do not constitute separate causes of action); Hawthorne v. Siegel, 25 P. 1114,
1116 (Cal. 1891) (ruling that damages which result subsequent to a tort, but are caused by
the tort, are not separate causes of action but are part of the same tort cause of action). See 
also cases cited supra note 70. 
72. Agarwal, along with Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1975), are the 
only two California Supreme Court decisions to undertake a primary rights analysis for
the purpose of a res judicata determination after the repeal of former § 427 and the 
adoption in 1972 of unrestricted permissive joinder of claims. The case of Holmes v. 
David H. Bricker, Inc., 452 P.2d 647 (Cal. 1969), although viewed as a modern primary
rights decision, was decided before the repeal of former § 427 and was clearly influenced 
by the original version of that statute. In a 1972 opinion, Busick v. Workmen’s
Compensation Appeals Bd., 500 P.2d 1386 (Cal. 1972), the Court held that the plaintiff’s
582
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cases73 has made references to its primary rights analysis in dicta and not 
in the context of res judicata, but has not squarely addressed the claim 
preclusion standard in the seventeen years since Agarwal. This 
particular period of time is significant.  In 1982 the American Law 
Institute published the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. The 
California Supreme Court has not directly addressed the claim 
preclusion standard since that important pronouncement.  The court has 
rendered some recent opinions on collateral estoppel—decisions that 
seem to follow the second Restatement’s issue preclusion doctrine74— 
prior money judgment against the defendant employer precluded a worker’s 
compensation proceeding to recover compensation for the same injuries.  The Court 
found that the plaintiff had brought the same cause of action, which it defined as “the
obligation sought to be enforced,” in both proceedings. Id. at 1392. The violation of one 
primary right, the court observed, “constitutes a single cause of action even though two
mutually exclusive remedies are available.”  Id.
The Busick court’s brief discussion of primary rights broke no new ground, but simply
reaffirmed the basic claim preclusion notion that there is but one cause of action for one
personal injury by reason of one wrongful act. Id.  Interestingly, the Busick court cited 
repeatedly to the first RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942) to support much of its
general res judicata analysis. See Busick, 500 P.2d at 1390-91, nn.7-10. In Slater, the 
court held that the plaintiff’s prior unsuccessful statutory negligence action to recover
damages for personal injuries precluded her second action seeking the same damages but 
this time based on common law negligence. Although the two lawsuits sought relief 
under two different legal theories, the court concluded that both were based on the
violation of the same primary right. Slater, 543 P.2d at 594-95. In holding that res 
judicata barred plaintiff’s second action, the court relied on the established rule that a 
cause of action “is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory
asserted by the litigant.” Id. at 594. 
73. See Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1090-94 (Cal. 1994) (discussing the
primary rights theory and concluding it was inapplicable to a determination of whether
probable cause existed to defeat a malicious prosecution action); Bay Cities Paving &
Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 1263, 1265-70 (Cal. 1993) (ruling that
in determining the meaning of the word “claim” in a malpractice insurance policy, the fact
that the claimant had only one cause of action under the primary rights theory, although not
controlling, was illustrative). For more discussion of Bay Cities, see infra text accompanying 
notes 88-92.
74. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n, 838 P.2d 781, 784 n.7
(Cal. 1992) (citing § 27, comment h, of the second RESTATEMENT and finding no collateral
estoppel effect of issue decided previously because the issue was unnecessary to prior 
judgment); Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 1223, 1225 n.3 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 500 
U.S. 920 (1991) (citing § 27 of the second RESTATEMENT and adopting its content); George
Arakelian Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 783 P.2d 749, 755 (Cal. 1989)
(quoting § 27 and citing to § 13 and § 83 of the second RESTATEMENT in defining
California’s collateral estoppel doctrine); People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1975)
(relying on the second RESTATEMENT § 27, comment d, to determine the whether an issue
was “actually litigated” in a prior proceeding); cf. Gikas v. Zolin, 863 P.2d 745, 760-62 (Cal.
1993) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting § 75, comments a and b, and § 41(1) (a) of the second
RESTATEMENT as part of privity analysis).
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2.	 Contradictory Primary Rights Decisions by the Courts of Appeal 
Further Increase Unpredictability
The California Supreme Court has provided the lower courts with 
scant modern primary rights precedent, and the little it has provided is
unclear. The courts of appeal have been far more active in developing 
the primary rights analysis.  Unfortunately, the lower courts’ post-1971 
opinions have often contradicted one another, have sometimes ignored 
the “harm suffered” approach entirely, and have generally decreased the 
predictive significance of primary rights analysis for litigants and trial
judges. Left largely to their own doctrinal devices, the courts of appeal
have further muddled the “harm suffered” test through a series of
questionable applications. The most famous is the 1981 decision in
Sawyer v. First City Financial Corp..75 
The Sawyer plaintiffs brought two separate lawsuits against essentially 
the same defendants arising from the same general set of facts.  The 
plaintiffs, owners and sellers of undeveloped land, had sold their land to
the defendants, purchasers and encumbrancer of the land who sought to
develop it. The plaintiffs received partial payment from the defendants
in cash, and a promissory note secured by a deed of trust for the
remainder.  Concurrently with this sale, the defendants borrowed a large 
development loan from a bank.  As part of this transaction, the plaintiffs 
agreed to subordinate their deed of trust to this new encumbrance and
specifically waived any deficiency judgment with respect to their note 
and deed of trust. Consequently, the plaintiffs’ sole resource for 
collection of their note was foreclosure on their deed of trust, now
subordinate to the bank’s first deed of trust.  The defendants-purchasers 
subsequently defaulted on their note to the defendant bank, and the bank
foreclosed on the deed of trust. The bank then purchased the land at the 
foreclosure sale for less than the amount due the bank on its note.  As a 
result, the plaintiffs’ promissory note remained unpaid with no recourse 
against the land or the defendants-purchasers.
In their first action, the plaintiffs alleged that the contractual waiver of 
their right to a deficiency judgment was invalid, and, alleging breach of 
contract, sought recovery of the unpaid balance of their note from the 
defendants. The superior court ruled that the waiver of deficiency and 
subordination clause signed by the plaintiffs was valid, and entered 
judgment for the defendants.  The plaintiffs then pursued a second action 
75. 177 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1981).
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against the defendants, this time alleging fraudulent conspiracy among
the defendants to cause a default in the bank’s note and trust deed, to 
hold a sham foreclosure sale, and to take other action for the purpose of
eliminating the obligation to the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs’ second suit,
grounded in tort instead of breach of contract, alleged the same monetary
damages as unsuccessfully sought in their first suit.  The defendants 
obtained a summary judgment based on res judicata, and the plaintiffs
appealed. 
The question for the Sawyer court was whether the plaintiffs had 
alleged a different cause of action or primary right in their second action 
than that alleged in their first unsuccessful suit against the defendants. 
The court reviewed the primary rights precedents and acknowledged that 
they were not purely logical.  The court did, however, acknowledge that 
the “harm suffered” played a central role in determining whether the 
plaintiffs’ two lawsuits split the same cause of action.  Accordingly, it 
reasoned that the plaintiffs had not necessarily alleged two causes of 
action simply because their first action was based on breach of contract
and the second on tort theories.  But the court did find dispositive the 
differences in the factual structure of the plaintiffs’ two lawsuits.  The
court noted that the case before it “is not one in which the same factual
structure is characterized in one complaint as a breach of contract and in 
another as a tort.”76  The court viewed the plaintiffs’ first action as solely 
on contract and based upon the note, the deed of trust, and the loan and 
the development agreement. The court also noted that there was no
contention and no evidence presented in the first suit relating to a
possible invalidation of the waiver on grounds of fraud or other tort.
Although the court recognized that the second action had as its object the 
collection of the same promissory note which was the subject matter of
the first lawsuit, the court viewed the basis of the claim as completely
different and as resting upon a completely separate set of facts.77  The  
court observed that “[s]urely one’s breach of contract by failing to pay a
note violates a ‘primary right’ which is separate from the ‘primary right’ 
76. Id. at 405.  Presumably, if the two cases had been based on the same factual
structure, the Sawyer court would have found that the plaintiffs’ had alleged two different
legal theories but the same cause of action. See, e.g., Slater, 543 P.2d at 594-95 (holding that 
even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery may be predicated, one
injury gives rise to only one cause of action); Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242
(Cal. 1943) (holding that prior judgment for defendant barred plaintiff’s instant personal
injury action even though based on an entirely different theory of negligence).
77. See Sawyer, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
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not to have the note stolen.”78  Although the monetary loss in the two 
lawsuits was measured by the same unpaid promissory note amount, the 
court viewed the plaintiffs as being harmed differently by tortious 
conduct destroying the value of the note than by the contractual breach 
of simply failing to pay it.79 
From a “harm suffered” approach, the decision in Sawyer seems
clearly wrong.  The harm suffered—the loss of part of the purchase price
as represented by the unpaid promissory note—is identical in both 
lawsuits. The plaintiffs’ two cases may have involved different 
evidentiary bases and presented different theories of recovery, but they 
both sought recovery of the same unpaid monies.  However, although
the primary rights ruling in Sawyer has been questioned and 
distinguished, it has not been disapproved.80  If Sawyer remains good 
law, precisely what law does its reasoning establish?  Can a litigant 
safely rely on Sawyer for the proposition that an action based on tort 
involves a separate primary right from one based on contract, even 
though the relief sought in both actions is the same?  This view seems 
contrary to the basic rule that a cause of action is based upon the harm
suffered, instead of the particular legal theory asserted by the litigant.81 
Does Sawyer mean that a second action which seeks the same remedy as 
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., Weikel v. TCW Realty Fund II Holding Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25 (Ct. 
App. 1997) (distinguishing instant case because Sawyer involved a breach of contract
and a subsequent, separate tort); Brenelli Amedeo, S.P.A. v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., 35 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 351-53 (Ct. App. 1994) (relying on Sawyer to hold that a prior
judgment against defendant corporation based on contractual obligations involved a 
different primary right, and did not bar a second action for tortious conveyance of assets 
preventing plaintiff from collecting on his judgment); Gamble v. General Foods Corp.,
280 Cal. Rptr. 457, 467 (Ct. App. 1991) (distinguishing instant case from Sawyer “in that
the Sawyers’ first action was based on contract rights whereas their second action was 
grounded on fraud”); Jenkins v. Pope, 266 Cal. Rptr. 557, 561 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990)
(viewing Sawyer as finding two separate primary rights violated by a breach of contract
and acts of fraud arising from different sets of facts, whereas the instant case involved 
one primary right for failure to pay attorneys’ fees because actions for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation were based on same acts and misrepresentations); Wittman 
v. Chrysler Corp., 245 Cal. Rptr. 20, 24 n.3 (Ct. App. 1988) (expressing doubts about the 
correctness of the Sawyer court’s reasoning, but distinguishing the instant case because 
the issue of fraud was tendered in the prior contract action).
From a historical primary rights perspective, as opposed to the modern “harm 
suffered” approach, the holding in Sawyer is defensible. According to Pomeroy, a right 
arising from contract was a separate primary right from the rights to enjoy property and
to be free from injury to body and limb. See supra note 55.  The Sawyer court, however, 
did not attempt to justify its holding by reference to Pomeroy’s treatises.
81. See, e.g., Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593 (Cal. 1975) (holding that a prior
judgment for the defendant based upon statutory negligence barred a second action against
the defendant for the same personal injuries even though based on a different legal theory of
ordinary negligence).
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a prior action involves a different primary right when the facts alleged in
the second action are related to, but different than, those of the prior
action?  This meaning seems contrary to the basic rule that a primary
right is defined by the harm suffered, even though the plaintiff alleges a 
different factual theory for the recovery.82 Sawyer provides no answer to 
these questions, and therefore adds more ambiguity to an already 
uncertain area.83 
The Sawyer holding permitted prosecution of two lawsuits seeking 
recovery for the same injury, and thereby undermined  judicial economy
in both a substantive and administrative manner.  The court’s analysis 
has, however, produced some unexpected doctrinal results.  The Sawyer
court’s focus on the factual bases to determine the “same cause of 
action” led to another line of appellate court decisions, beginning in 
1987 with Nakash v. Superior Court,84 which have further clouded the
res judicata analysis.  The court in Nakash was called upon to decide 
whether res judicata permitted successive suits between the same parties
to rescind the same contract. The litigants in Nakash were two large 
clothing manufacturers who entered into a complicated fiduciary and 
business relationship structured to extend beyond any fixed termination 
point. As part of this arrangement, in 1983 the parties executed a written 
stock purchase agreement and a shareholders’ agreement.  Later that
same year, the plaintiffs filed an action in federal court seeking 
rescission of the 1983 transaction based upon fraud and failure of
consideration. This federal lawsuit ended in a settlement and release,
and was dismissed with prejudice in early 1984.  Several months later, 
the plaintiffs filed another action against the defendants in state court. 
This second suit also sought rescission of the 1983 transaction, once 
again alleging fraud and failure of consideration.  The defendants moved
for summary judgment based on res judicata.  When the superior court 
denied this motion, the defendants sought appellate review. 
Although the Nakash court cited California Supreme Court precedent 
82. See, e.g., Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 134 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1943) (holding that
the judgment for the defendant in a prior suit barred second suit to recover for the same
injuries even though based on an entirely different factual basis of negligence).
83. Perhaps the Sawyer holding can be justified on a negative transactional basis—the
facts relevant to the contract action arose from a different transaction than those relevant to
the subsequent fraud action. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.  This would be
an extremely narrow view of the “same transaction.”  At any rate, the court made no mention 
of this basis in its primary rights discussion.
84. 241 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1987).
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such as Slater v. Blackwood, the court eschewed reliance on the primary
rights theory. Instead, the court stated that the analysis of what
constitutes the same cause of action “has shifted from identification of a
primary right upon which only one [action] is allowed to determination
of the existence of a transaction involving a nucleus of facts upon which
only one [action] is allowed.”85  The court in Nakash expressly adopted 
the transactional approach contained in the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments;86 which is an approach that is analytically different from the
primary rights theory and in some applications would reach an opposite 
result. The Nakash court offered no controlling authority for
85. Id. at 583. 
86. Because the prior judgment was from a federal court, choice of law analysis
may have dictated that the Nakash court apply the RESTATEMENT’s transactional standard
instead of the California primary rights doctrine.  This observation requires some
elaboration. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), a federal court must apply state law—
the res judicata law of the state of rendition—in determining the preclusive effect of a
prior state court judgment. See, e.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75 (1984); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750
F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (ruling that the federal court must apply the primary
rights doctrine when determining the preclusive effect of a prior California state court 
judgment). However, a federal court applies federal law—the second RESTATEMENT’s 
transactional standard—when determining the preclusive effects of an earlier federal
court judgment. See Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S 394, 404 
(1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  Likewise, 
many state courts apply the federal standard when determining the preclusive effects of a 
prior federal court judgment in state court. See Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res 
Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 742-750 (1976); Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 733, 747-791 (1986). 
Although the California courts are not unanimous on this point, most apply the federal 
transactional standard to determine the res judicata effect of a previous federal court 
judgment. See, e.g., Levy v. Cohen, 561 P.2d 252, 257 (Cal. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 833 (1977) (ruling that a federal court judgment has the same effect in state court as 
it would have in federal court); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 82, 84-85
n.4 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying federal law to determine the res judicata effect of a prior
federal court judgment); Merry v. Coast Community College Dist., 158 Cal. Rptr. 603, 
611-12 (Ct. App. 1979); Martin v. Martin, 470 P.2d 662, 668 n.13 (Cal. 1970).  But see
Gamble v. General Foods Corp., 280 Cal. Rptr. 457 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying the 
California primary rights doctrine to determine preclusive effect of prior federal court 
judgment).
A careful reading of the Nakash opinion lends some support to the argument that the 
court was simply following this choice of law rule when applying the federal 
transactional standard to determine the res judicata effect of the prior federal court
judgment of dismissal. Nakash, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 583.  However, the court never made
this basis for its ruling clear when it eschewed reliance on the primary rights theory in 
favor of the RESTATEMENT’s transactional approach.  Moreover, the court’s general res
judicata analysis utilized primary rights precedent such as Slater, 543 P.2d 593, and CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1908; and the court’s ruling specifically relied on California cases
such as Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1981) and Neil 
Norman, Ltd. v. William Kasper & Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 198 (Ct. App. 1983). Nakash, 241 
Cal. Rptr. at 583-84. 
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supplanting the primary rights theory but relied on the Restatement, a 
federal Ninth Circuit decision, and Sawyer.87 
In the ten years since Nakash, the California Supreme Court has not
had occasion to rule squarely on the issue of whether it has indeed
shifted to the transactional standard.  Recently in Bay Cities Paving & 
Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Insurance Co.,88 the Court suggested 
that the transactional standard may play some role in defining a “cause
of action,” at least when construing that term in the context of coverage
under a malpractice insurance policy. The plaintiff in Bay Cities was a
general contractor who was owed money for its work on a construction
project. The attorney who had been representing the contractor in
connection with the project recorded a mechanic’s lien, but negligently 
failed to serve a stop notice on the lenders and thereafter negligently
failed to file a complaint to foreclose the lien.  As a result of the 
attorney’s omissions, the contractor was unable to collect the amount it 
was owed.  The contractor sued its attorney for legal malpractice.  The
attorney’s professional liability insurance policy contained a provision 
limiting coverage to a maximum of $ 250,000 “for each claim.”  The 
narrow issue before the Court was whether the policy’s $250,000 per 
claim limit applied to the attorney’s two omissions.  The California 
Supreme Court held that this limitation did apply.
The Bay Cities court ultimately determined the meaning of the word 
“claim” in the insurance policy by construction of the language of the 
policy, but noted that “[t]he reasoning as to proper pleading, though not
controlling, is illustrative in the present case.”89  The court ruled that the 
plaintiff had not asserted two causes of action.  Referring to primary
rights theory, the Court reasoned that Bay Cities had a single injury and 
thus a single cause of action against its attorney. “Bay Cities had one 
primary right—the right to be free of negligence by its attorney in 
connection with the particular debt collection for which he was retained. 
87. The court referred to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS generally,
and to comment a of section 24 specifically, as the source of its transactional standard. 
Nakash, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 583. After noting that this transactional approach had been
approved in Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1087, the court then relied on Sawyer, Neil Norman, and a quote from 7
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, JUDGMENTS § 246 (3d ed. 1985), as California
authorities for permitting successive suits between litigants who engaged in business 
transactions. Nakash, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84
88. 855 P.2d 1263 (Cal. 1993).
89. Id. at 1266. 
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He allegedly breached that right in two ways, but it nevertheless
remained a single right.”90  The court then noted that the attorney’s two 
acts of alleged procedural negligence, failure to foreclose the mechanic’s
lien and failure to serve a timely stop notice, “arose from the same
transaction” and were simply two omissions that resulted in a single
injury.91 
Although the California Supreme Court’s dicta in Bay Cities made 
some reference to the transactional standard, it did so only in an 
exclusive or negative manner to rebut any argument that the defendant’s
later negligence was not part of the same cause of action because it was
caused by a different transaction.92  The Court’s dicta still relied on the
primary rights theory to illustrate that the plaintiff had but one “claim,”
based on a single injury, within the meaning of the insurance policy. 
The Bay Cities opinion made no mention of the Nakash court’s use of 
the transactional standard. 
The Bay Cities opinion represents another missed opportunity by the 
California Supreme Court to provide some much-needed guidance, and 
has permitted the lower courts to adopt contradictory positions 
concerning the proper res judicata standard. The transactional standard 
announced by the Nakash court has had a mixed reception among the 
courts of appeal.  Two recent opinions have endorsed the Nakash
standard;93 but two others have expressly declined to follow this
standard.94  These contradictory opinions obviously have the potential to 
create even greater unpredictability in the application of res judicata. 
Hopefully, the California Supreme Court will recognize the need, in the 
next appropriate case, to resolve this developing conflict. 
Ironically, Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers,95 one of the recent 
decisions to expressly reject the Nakash court’s transactional standard,96 
90. Id.
91. Id.
 92. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of California’s 
use of a transactional notion in an exclusive or negative manner as opposed to the 
RESTATEMENT’s use of the transactional standard in an inclusive or positive manner.
93. Mata v. City of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 319  (Ct. App. 1993);
Hulsey v. Koehler, 267 Cal. Rptr. 523, 526 (Ct. App. 1990) (dicta); cf. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 677-78 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting 
that in determining whether two proceedings involve the “same controversy,” one factor 
is “whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts”).
94. Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 321 n.6 (Ct. App. 
1994) (declining to apply the transactional “nucleus of facts” test because it was 
inconsistent with the controlling authority of California Supreme Court); Brenelli 
Amedeo v. Bakara Furniture, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 351 (Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that 
the firmly settled rule in California is the primary rights theory, and therefore the trial 
court incorrectly applied the transactional test).
95. Branson, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314. 
96. See supra note 94. 
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also ignored the significance of the “harm suffered” standard.  Branson, 
a former marketing manager of the defendant Sun-Diamond Growers, 
became an independent commodity food broker and took the Sun-
Diamond Growers account away from the former exclusive broker, Plate 
Company. Plate Company sued Branson for intentional interference
with its contract, which resulted in a verdict of $275,968 against 
Branson. Branson then filed a motion to compel statutory
indemnification of the verdict by Sun-Diamond Growers pursuant to 
California Corporations Code Section 317, which requires a corporation
to indemnify its agent against a judgment arising from the agent’s good 
faith acts on behalf of the corporation. The court in this prior litigation 
held that Sun-Diamond Growers could not be ordered to indemnify
Branson under Section 317 because Branson had not been sued by Plate 
for activity undertaken as an agent of Sun-Diamond Growers, but for 
activity taken entirely independently of Sun-Diamond Growers.  In 
addition, Branson had not acted in good faith, a prerequisite for 
indemnification under the statute.97 
Branson then commenced an action against Sun-Diamond Growers 
seeking indemnification for the prior judgment of $275,968 based on 
allegations of contractual and quasi-contractual rights of indemnity as 
opposed to statutory indemnity.  The trial court ruled Branson’s
complaint was barred by res judicata, and Branson appealed.  After an
extensive review of the doctrine of res judicata, including discussions of 
Pomeroy, Slater, Bay Cities, and Agarwal, the Court of Appeal reversed.
The court held that Branson’s present complaint asserted a different
primary right than that involved in the prior judgment, and therefore his 
contractual indemnity causes of action were not barred.98  In reaching  
this holding, the court acknowledged the admonition from Pomeroy and 
Slater that a “‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as 
opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant.”99 Nevertheless,
the court focused on Agarwal and its progeny for the proposition that 
different primary rights may be violated by the same wrongful 
conduct.100  Without further explanation as to how the “harm suffered”
97. Id. at 317-19.  The appellate decision in this prior litigation is Plate v. Sun-
Diamond Growers, 275 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Ct. App. 1990). 
98. Id. at 322-23. The court also discussed some additional reasons why the 
judgment in the former case did not bar the present action, but these other reasons were 
secondary to its primary rights holding. Id. at 323-24. 
99. Id. at 321. 
100. See id. at 322. 
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by Branson was different in the two actions, nor why the statutory and
contractual indemnity actions invoked separate primary rights as 
opposed to separate theories of recovery, the court concluded that the 
primary right to seek statutory indemnification was not the same cause
of action as one seeking contractual indemnification.101 
3. 	 The Courts of Appeal Struggle with the California Supreme Court’s 
Agarwal Decision 
As Branson illustrates, the lower courts have also struggled with the 
legacy of Agarwal v. Johnson, the last California Supreme Court ruling 
on primary rights.  In Agarwal, the plaintiff’s first action was in federal
court for back wages under the authority of the federal Civil Rights Act. 
The California Supreme Court determined that an adverse judgment in
the federal action was no bar to a second suit in superior court for 
damages for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Although the same set of facts was presented in each action, the Court
held that one primary right was created by the federal statute prohibiting 
discriminatory employment practices and a second primary right was 
grounded in the state common law of torts.  Also, the “harm suffered”
was deemed separable since damages for lost wages in the federal action 
were distinct from damages for injury to reputation and peace of mind in 
the state case.
Because the “harm suffered” analysis in Agarwal was at odds with 
established tort precedent,102 some thought Agarwal stood for the
general proposition that misconduct which violated both federal and
state laws necessarily violated two primary rights.103  However, the vast
majority of decisions have held that a plaintiff’s injuries caused by a 
defendant’s misconduct which violates both a federal civil rights statute 
and state common law constitute but one primary right.104  Attempts to 
101. See id. at 323. 
102. See authorities cited supra notes 70-71. 
103. For example, in Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 203 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Ct.
App. 1984), the plaintiff argued that a prior federal court class action judgment resolving 
a challenge to the defendant’s mandatory pregnancy leave policy under federal civil
rights statutes involved a different primary right than the instant state court lawsuit 
challenging the same policy under state civil rights statutes.  Id. at 640-41. The court 
observed that the plaintiff’s argument was not novel and found that the same primary
right—the right to be free from employment discrimination based on sex—was asserted
in both actions and that the instant state court action was barred by res judicata. Id.
104. The courts uniformly hold that where both laws are intended to redress the 
same harm only one primary right is involved. See, e.g., Mattson v. City of Costa Mesa,
164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916-17 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that plaintiff’s state court action
seeking damages for unlawful arrest based on state negligence law involved the same
primary right as plaintiff’s claim for damages under a federal civil rights statute 
unfavorably determined by a prior federal court jury verdict); Johnson, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 
592
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pursue the state and federal violations in two lawsuits have been held 
barred by res judicata because the second action was “simply a different
way of expressing an invasion of the same primary rights or the assertion 
of a different legal theory of recovery.”105  Nevertheless, the Agarwal
opinion continues to produce unpredictable consequences when applied 
in similar factual circumstances, as illustrated by the two areas of recent
appellate court decisions discussed below. 
a.	 Wrongful Termination from Public Employment and Administrative 
Mandamus Actions: How Many Primary Rights Involved? 
In Takahashi v. Board of Education,106 the court of appeal concluded 
that plaintiff’s instant wrongful termination action seeking damages for 
employment discrimination was barred by the res judicata effect of a 
prior unsuccessful mandamus action, which was initiated by the plaintiff 
to compel her reinstatement as a teacher.  The plaintiff, after a hearing 
before the Commission on Professional Competence, was dismissed 
from her employment as a public school teacher by the defendant school 
board on the basis of incompetency.107  After the commission found 
cause for dismissal and ordered her termination, the plaintiff commenced
a mandamus action in superior court to review the commission’s 
decision. This action challenged the commission’s finding of 
incompetency as not supported by the evidence, as well as the 
commission’s jurisdiction to proceed, based on the state’s education
640-41 (holding that plaintiff’s state court action challenging defendant’s mandatory
maternity leave-without-pay policy under the state fair employment statute barred by
prior federal class action consent decree under federal civil rights statute because both
lawsuits alleged the same primary right to be free from employment discrimination); 
Ford Motor Co. v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (Ct. App. 1973) (holding that 
complaint alleging violations of federal and state anti-trust statutes rested on but a single 
invasion of one primary right, and therefore constituted one cause of action); see also
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. Rptr. 320, 326 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that a prior federal civil rights action barred a subsequent superior court common law tort 
action, where both involved the wrongful seizure of personal property, on the ground
that both laws were designed to vindicate the same interests in personal property);
Takahashi v. Board of Educ. of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 578, 585 (Ct. 
App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989) (holding that plaintiff’s wrongful 
termination action in superior court based on the federal civil rights act and constitution
involved the same primary right as in plaintiff’s prior state court mandamus action based
on state statutory and common law). 
105. Mattson, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 917. 
106. Takahashi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 585. 
107. See id. at 580-82. 
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code. The plaintiff’s mandamus petition was denied by the superior 
court, and this denial was affirmed on appeal. 
The plaintiff then commenced subsequent wrongful discharge 
litigation in state court against the defendant school board, this time
seeking monetary and injunctive relief on a variety of state common law
and federal constitutional grounds. Her complaint alleged breach of 
employment contract, conspiracy to defraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and discrimination in employment on account of her
sex, race, and ancestry. The superior court granted defendant’s motion
for summary judgment concluding that the prior state mandamus
judgment barred the current action on the basis of res judicata, and the 
plaintiff appealed.108 
The main issue for the court of appeal was whether the primary right 
asserted in the instant action was the same as that presented in the 
previous mandamus proceeding.  The court determined that both actions 
involved the identical primary right—the plaintiff’s contractual right to
employment.109  The court discussed Agarwal at length and concluded
that separate primary rights were involved because the harms for which 
the plaintiff in Agarwal sought damages were different in the two 
actions. In contrast, the plaintiff in Takahashi suffered a single harm— 
alleged wrongful termination of her employment. The court reasoned
that each act complained of by the plaintiff caused her dismissal or was
the consequence of her dismissal, and each act was therefore part and
parcel of the violation of a single primary right.  Her allegations of 
emotional distress and other consequential injuries, according to the 
court, were not based upon the infringement of a separate primary right. 
The court found that the same primary right was involved even though 
the commission did not have jurisdiction to award damages and, 
consequently, that the mandamus proceeding was necessarily limited in 
available relief to compelling reinstatement.  The court reasoned that 
because the commission had the authority to entertain any defense
imposed by the plaintiff, the commission’s lack of authority to award
108. In between these two state court actions, the plaintiff had also filed a federal 
court action for damages and injunctive relief based on various federal civil rights 
statutes.  The federal district court held that the decision in the first state court action
precluded the plaintiff’s federal court case, and the U.S. court of appeals affirmed that 
holding. See Takahashi v. Board of Trustees of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 783 F.2d 
848 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).  The Court of Appeal in the 
subsequent state court Takahashi litigation noted that this prior federal judgment may
have provided a separate basis for claim preclusion. Takahashi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 592. 
However, the court declined to determine the res judicata effect of the prior federal 
judgment because it concluded that the state court’s denial of plaintiff’s petition for 
mandamus in the first state court action barred the second state court litigation. Id.
109. See Takahashi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
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damages did not excuse the plaintiff’s failure to present all her defenses
to the defendant’s charge of incompetency at the termination hearing.110 
The Takahashi court considered all the alleged “harm suffered” by the 
plaintiff (wrongful discharge from employment, sex and race 
discrimination, lost wages, and punitive damages) to constitute one 
primary right—the right to be free from wrongful termination from 
employment.  As a result, the court found only one cause of action that 
could not be split between two lawsuits.  Despite the court’s attempt to
distinguish Agarwal, the nature of the harms suffered in those two cases
appears to be the same.  Yet where the Agarwal Court found two 
primary rights violated, the Takahashi court found only one. What 
guidance do these precedents provide litigators and judges in such 
typical situations of wrongful discharge from public employment? 
Should the discharged employee follow the Takahashi court’s advice 
and pursue all her rights to relief through the administrative hearing 
process, even though the administrative tribunal lacks authority to award
damages or injunctive relief?  Or may the dismissed employee rely on 
Agarwal by only requesting reinstatement though the administrative 
process and pursuing other relief through an independent court action? 
Unfortunately, the decisions subsequent to Takahashi provide 
inconsistent guidance as to the appropriate litigation behavior in such 
cases.
In a remarkably similar fact situation to that in Takahashi, the Court of 
Appeal in Craig v. County of Los Angeles111 reached an opposite
primary rights conclusion.  The plaintiff in Craig had applied for a 
position as a harbor patrol officer with the defendant sheriff’s 
department, but was denied employment. The plaintiff then petitioned 
the Civil Service Commission for a hearing, which resulted in a 
determination that the decision not to hire the plaintiff was improper. 
Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced a mandamus action in superior 
court, which ultimately led to a court order compelling the defendant to 
110. Quite apart from any concerns about the Takahashi court’s primary rights 
analysis, the court’s claim preclusion ruling seems questionable in light of the well-
recognized exception to the general rule against splitting causes of action.  This 
exception is permitted where a plaintiff was unable to seek a certain remedy or form of 
relief in a prior proceeding because of limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
first tribunal to entertain certain demands for relief, and the plaintiff desires in a second 
action to seek that remedy or form of relief. See discussion and authorities cited supra
note 28 and infra notes 149-50. 
111. 271 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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comply with the Civil Service Commission order to hire the plaintiff. 
Finally, yielding to the court’s order, the defendant hired the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff then filed another lawsuit in superior court against the 
defendant, this time seeking money damages for fraud, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and employment discrimination.  The
superior court dismissed this action as barred by res judicata, and the
plaintiff appealed. 
The question for the Craig court was whether the prior state 
mandamus proceeding involved the same primary right as the instant
case. The Court of Appeal held that the two actions involved different
primary rights, although they arose out of the same subject matter.  The 
primary right involved in the previous mandamus proceeding was the 
right to be employed as a harbor officer, whereas the instant action 
involved the right to recover damages because of the denial of that 
employment right.  Relying on Agarwal, the court viewed the types of
harm involved in the two proceedings as distinct.  The harm suffered in
the mandamus action was the denial of the harbor patrol position despite 
the commission’s order that he be hired.  In the present action, the harm 
suffered included the emotional distress which resulted from defendant’s
wrongful conduct. Since the plaintiff “is seeking to recover damages for
harm distinct from his action to compel enforcement of the
Commission’s order, there are different primary rights involved.”112 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the prior mandate action did not 
bar the present damage action.
The Craig decision is difficult to reconcile with the Takahashi
holding. In both cases the plaintiffs failed to raise their various damages
claims in their prior mandamus proceedings, but did so in subsequent 
lawsuits.113  The Takahashi court held that the two actions involved the
112. Id. at 87. 
113. Another remarkable similarity to the facts in Takahashi is that in between the 
two state court actions, the plaintiff in Craig filed an action in federal court against the 
defendants for employment discrimination under federal civil rights statutes, and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud.  The federal court held that the 
federal claims were barred by res judicata based on the prior state proceedings, but
exercised its discretion to not hear the pendant state claims and dismissed them.  See
Craig, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84, 87. 
The Craig court found that this prior federal judgment did not bar plaintiff’s 
subsequent state court action, at least as to the state law claims not decided by the federal 
court.  This determination is questionable from a primary rights standpoint and is 
opposite the result reached by the court in Takahashi, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 592, but appears 
consistent with prior precedent regarding the effect of a federal court’s refusal to hear
pendent state claims. See, e.g., Koch v. Hankins, 273 Cal. Rptr. 442 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that a prior federal judgment against plaintiff under federal securities laws did
not preclude the instant action based on state claims where the federal court had declined
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims); Merry v. Coast Community
College Dist., 158 Cal. Rptr. 603, 609-13 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that a federal court’s
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same primary right and constituted prohibited splitting of one cause of 
action into successive lawsuits.  But the Craig court found the two
proceedings raised different primary rights, which the plaintiff was
permitted to pursue in two separate lawsuits.  Both opinions profess to
follow Agarwal and the “harm suffered” approach.  Whether one court 
correctly applied this standard and the other did not is difficult to
determine from an analytical standpoint.114  More importantly, this
conflict between primary rights precedents produces obvious uncertainty 
for litigants as to the appropriate litigation behavior in public employee 
dismissal cases.  Must parties present every right to relief in the 
administrative proceeding and, if unsuccessful there, seek judicial
review by administrative mandamus?115  Or should they reserve certain 
refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims following pretrial dismissal of a
federal claim did not bar subsequent litigation of the state claims in state court).
114. In one recent case involving dismissal from public employment for 
insubordination, Swartzendruber v. City of San Diego, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64 (Ct. App.
1992), the court followed Takahashi and held that a prior Civil Service Commission 
decision upholding the dismissal barred a subsequent civil rights action because both 
involved the same primary right—the right to continued employment. Id. at 71-72.  As in
Takahashi, the plaintiff in Swartzendruber failed to raise her civil rights claims during
the administrative proceeding, and also failed to seek judicial review of the 
administrative hearing decision through an administrative mandamus action.  Id.
In another wrongful discharge case involving a public employee, Mata v. City of Los
Angeles, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 1993), the court distinguished Takahashi on two
grounds. First, unlike Takahashi, the plaintiff in Mata filed both a mandamus petition to 
review the administrative decision of dismissal and a civil rights action for damages in
one lawsuit. Id. at 320.  Second, unlike the Takahashi plaintiff, the plaintiff in Mata
prevailed in his petition for administrative mandamus. Id. at 320. 
115. A party must exhaust available administrative adjudicative remedies as a 
prerequisite to litigation.  See, e.g., Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 551 
P.2d 410 (Cal. 1976); Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal of Cal., 109 P.2d 942, 949
(Cal. 1941).  If such a party obtains an adverse administrative hearing decision, she must
then seek judicial review of the administrative hearing decision, through the procedural 
vehicle of “administrative mandamus” as a precondition to commencement of a 
compensation action.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1980). Failure to seek
judicial review of the administrative hearing decision will preclude any subsequent tort
or civil rights damage action. See, e.g., Westlake, 551 P.2d at 420-22 (holding that a 
mandamus proceeding was a prerequisite to a tort action by a plaintiff whose hospital 
privileges were revoked); Briggs v. City of Rolling Hills Estates, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 32­
35 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that failure to seek administrative mandamus review of
zoning variance decision precluded plaintiff’s independent civil rights action for
damages and injunctive relief); Swartzendruber, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 67-69 (holding that 
plaintiff’s failure to seek mandamus review of prior administrative hearing adjudication
upholding discipline precluded independent suit for damages); Patrick Media Group, Inc. 
v. California Coastal Comm’n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 840 (Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that 
plaintiff’s failure to seek timely mandamus review of an adverse Coastal Commission
determination barred, based on res judicata, any subsequent action for compensation).
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matters for litigation in a separate lawsuit?  Because the application of 
the primary rights doctrine is unclear in such circumstances, parties lack
guidance on how best to proceed so as not to forfeit important
substantive rights without incurring unnecessary litigation expenses.
The unpredictable nature of the primary rights doctrine in such public
employee dismissal cases not only fosters inefficiency, it seems
fundamentally unfair.
b. The “Double Injury” Problem: One or Two Primary           
Rights Involved? 
Another difficult post-Agarwal question arises where a plaintiff 
suffers multiple personal injuries caused by a defendant’s wrongful act,
but the injuries are distinctly different in type and are separated in time.
Does each type of injury, particularly when the later one is more serious
and manifests itself long after the earlier injury, constitute a different 
primary right?  The California appellate courts are split on this issue. 
Some courts have reasoned that a later-occurring, distinctly different 
injury constitutes an invasion of a separate primary right.  Others have 
If a plaintiff seeks judicial review by administrative mandamus and prevails (for 
example, if the plaintiff were to obtain the reversal of an adverse administrative hearing 
decision regarding reinstatement in public employment), several decisions have held that 
the plaintiff is then permitted to commence a separate action for compensatory damages. 
See, e.g., Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 410 (Cal. 1976);
Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 244 Cal. Rptr. 764, 770 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
to the extent plaintiff can prove he suffered emotional distress from an improper
termination, nothing in an earlier administrative proceeding ordering his reinstatement 
prevents plaintiff from commencing an action); Daugherty v. Board of Trustees of South
Bay Union High Sch. Dist., 244 P.2d 950, 952 (Ct. App. 1952) (holding that favorable 
judgment ordering reinstatement of teacher in prior mandamus action was not a bar to a 
second action for unpaid salary because the “causes of action in the two proceedings
were thus separate and distinct, although arising out of the same subject matter”).  This
factual difference between Takahashi and Craig  may serve to distinguish those two
cases on an expedient, pragmatic basis, but it does not reconcile their divergent “primary
rights” holdings from an analytical standpoint.  A basic principle of res judicata is that a 
prior judgment precludes relitigation of the same cause of action in a subsequent 
proceeding, regardless of which party prevailed in the prior action. See  RESTATEMENT, 
supra note 11, §§ 17, 18 [merger], 19 [bar]; Busick v. Workmen’s Compensation 
Appeals Bd., 500 P.2d 1386, 1392-93 (Cal. 1972) (applying res judicata rule of merger 
and holding that a prior money judgment for plaintiff precluded plaintiff’s instant action 
for recovery of workers’ compensation benefits against the same defendant employer);
Acuña v. Regents of University of California, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that a prior federal judgment awarding damages to plaintiff for age 
discrimination barred plaintiff’s instant action seeking additional damages for race
discrimination); Tensor Group v. City of Glendale, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that, under res judicata doctrine of merger, plaintiff’s prior mandate action
which resulted in a declaration that city’s ordinance was void extinguished all plaintiff’s 
rights to relief and therefore precluded separate inverse condemnation action for 
damages). 
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found that a plaintiff who alleges various immediate and later personal 
injuries as the result of a defendant’s tortious act states only one cause of 
action. Although these cases involved the proper definition of a “cause 
of action” for purposes of determining whether the relevant statute of
limitations had expired, their primary rights analyses seem equally
applicable to res judicata determinations.116 
One such case is Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc.,117 
which involved a plaintiff who developed cataracts sixteen years after
using an anti-cholesterol drug manufactured by the defendant.  A few 
months after he began taking the drug, the plaintiff experienced vision 
problems caused by the drug and a rash that lasted six weeks.  The
plaintiff did not commence a products liability action against the 
defendant, however, until after he discovered the cataracts.  The trial
court granted a summary judgment for the defendant manufacturer on 
the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.  On
appeal, the Martinez-Ferrer court concluded that the plaintiff’s action 
was not barred by the statute of limitations because his action for 
damages for his cataracts was a different cause of action than the one he
had for his earlier injuries.  The court did not articulate a clear rule in 
116. The California courts appear to treat the definition of “cause of action” for the 
purpose of res judicata as the same as for the determination of accrual for statutes of 
limitations.  See, e.g., Holmes v. David H. Brickner, Inc., 452 P.2d 647, 649-50 (Cal. 
1969); Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 597 (Ct. App.
1980); see also Grudt v. City of Los Angeles, 468 P.2d 825, 829 (Cal. 1970) (utilizing
primary rights analysis to determine whether amended complaint alleged the same cause
of action as, and therefore related back to, the original pleading).  The courts in other 
jurisdictions are less sure in their treatment. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  The policy reasons behind res judicata 
and the statute of limitations are quite similar.  See Susan Demidovich, Recent Cases, 52 
U. CIN. L. REV. 239, 251-252 (1983) (discussing the similarities in the two doctrines). 
The fundamental purpose of statutes of limitations is to give defendants reasonable 
repose, that is, to protect parties from defending stale claims and require plaintiffs to
diligently pursue their claims.  See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923, 928 (Cal. 
1988); Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Cal. 1975).  Likewise, the purposes of res
judicata are to protect against vexatious litigation and to conserve judicial resources. See 
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The “double injury” problem becomes a res judicata problem where the plaintiff files a 
timely action and recovers a modest damage award as compensation for the first
significant personal injury, but later commences a second action against the same 
defendant to recover additional damages after manifestation of far more serious injury
caused by the same tortious act.  The question then is whether the second action is 
precluded by the prior judgment as a matter of res judicata under the rule of merger, as 
well as whether the second action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
117. 164 Cal. Rptr. 591, 597 (Ct. App. 1980). 
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finding two primary rights, but noted that the “wind [was] blowing:
away from a blind adherence to rigid concepts of what constitutes a 
cause of action. . . without . . . insult to established rules of law, such as 
the merger aspect of the rule of res judicata.”118 
A number of decisions have directly relied on the Martinez-Ferrer
primary rights analysis.119  In Zambrano v. Dorough,120 for example, the
plaintiff suffered a variety of personal injuries caused by the defendant’s
medical malpractice.  Her immediate injuries included emotional 
distress, pain, blood clots, and a ruptured fallopian tube.  Three years
later she developed additional injuries allegedly caused by the same 
malpractice, and as a result, underwent a complete hysterectomy.  The
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages for the loss of her reproductive 
capacity, based on the malpractice that occurred three years earlier.  The
Zambrano court concluded that the action was not barred by the one-
year statute of limitations because the loss of reproductive capacity was 
a different type of injury than the one she suffered earlier, and it 
constituted a different primary right and therefore a separate cause of 
action.121 
A view contrary to Martinez-Ferrer was stated in the analogous case 
of DeRose v. Carswell.122 The plaintiff in DeRose sued her stepfather
for assault, battery, and infliction of mental distress for alleged sexual 
child abuse that had occurred over 13 years earlier.  The trial court
dismissed her action as barred by the statute of limitations.  On appeal,
the plaintiff argued that even if the statute of limitations barred an action
based on the harm immediately caused by the assaults, nevertheless, she
stated a separate cause of action based on the subsequent emotional 
harm which she experienced as an adult.  The court of appeal rejected
this argument and found that her complaint alleged only one cause of 
action in tort for the invasion of one primary right.  The court 
characterized the holdings in Zambrano and Martinez-Ferrer as
violating the rule against splitting a cause of action.123  The  DeRose
118. Id. at 597. The court did not attempt to distinguish the traditional primary
rights rule that a single tort gives rise to only one claim for damages, but instead relied
on various authorities, including the tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS, to support its view that the rigors of the merger aspect of res judicata were 
undergoing “substantial relaxation.” Id. The court ended its primary rights analysis by
confessing that it would “make no attempt to even summarize where all this may lead.”
Id.
119. See authorities cited infra notes 124 and 159. 
120. 224 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Ct. App. 1986). 
121. See id. at 326 (stating that the plaintiff’s “right to be free of the transitory
damages of discomfort and distress is separate from and independent of her right to have
children”). 
122. 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987). 
123. See DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 375 n.5, quoting Panos v. Great W. Packing Co., 
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court’s disapproving view of Martinez-Ferrer and Zambrano has since
been adopted by at least one other court.124 
The contradictory positions taken by the appellate courts in these 
double-injury cases illustrate once again the unpredictability of the 
primary rights approach generally, and the “harm suffered” approach
specifically, when utilized to define a cause of action.  The California 
Supreme Court could provide a resolution to this problem simply by
ruling that a later injury does or does not constitute an invasion of the 
same primary right as an earlier injury.125  Admittedly, such a
pronouncement would make disposition of these double-injury cases far
more predictable.  However, as discussed below in Part III of this 
Article, utilization of the primary rights theory to resolve this problem 
masks a welter of important policy decisions, of which predictability is
but one concern.126 
134 P.2d 242, 244 (Cal. 1943) (noting that their primary rights reasoning was contrary to 
“[t]he longstanding rule in California . . . that ‘[a] single tort can be the foundation for
but one claim for damages’”). 
124. See Miller v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, Inc., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 
(Ct. App. 1991). Although the majority of the court in Miller criticized the reasoning 
and holding of Martinez-Ferrer, a concurring opinion in Miller specifically endorsed the
primary rights rationale enunciated in Martinez-Ferrer but found it inapplicable to the
facts at hand. See id. at 805, 807-10 (Woods, J., concurring).  Likewise, a majority of
the court in Marsha V. v. Gardner, 281 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Ct.  App. 1991) followed the 
holding in DeRose, but a dissenting opinion applied the Martinez-Ferrer primary rights 
analysis. See id. at 478 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
125. Currently before the California Supreme Court is Mitchell v. Asbestos Corp., 
73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 1998), superceded by grant of review, 957 P.2d 868 (Cal. 
1998), a double-injury case which presents the issue of whether the extraordinarily
accommodating provisions of section 340.2 can justify a departure from the rule against
splitting a cause of action.
126. The double-injury problem frequently occurs in litigation seeking recovery for 
personal injuries caused by exposure to asbestos.  See, e.g., Buttram v. Owens-Corning 
Fiberglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997) (collecting latent disease asbestosis cases 
involving accrual for purpose of statute of limitations and holding that a cause of action
for damages arising from latent and progressive disease will be deemed to have accrued,
for the limited purpose of determining whether the tort reform measures of Proposition 
51 could be fairly applied prospectively to a lawsuit, when the disease is diagnosed or 
plaintiff otherwise discovers illness or injuries, whichever is earliest).  The California
legislature has responded to this problem by enacting a special one year statute of 
limitations which delays accrual of the cause of action until such time as the plaintiff 
first suffers a “disability” caused by asbestos exposure.  See  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
340.2 (Deering 1995).  The statute then defines “disability” to mean the loss of time 
from work as a result of such exposure “which precludes the performance of the 
employee’s regular occupation.” Id. § 340.2(b). 
For a discussion of judicial responses to the double-injury problem in asbestos 
exposure litigation in jurisdictions other than California, see infra note160. 
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A. 	 The California Supreme Court Should Overrule Primary  Rights 
Precedent and Adopt the Restatement
California’a res judicata doctrine lacks predictability.  The doctrine 
does not provide litigants with a clear warning of its consequences when
invoked in many typical factual situations.  The courts have not
developed a consistent approach when applying the primary rights 
theory of claim preclusion.  Res judicata principles that made sense
when adopted in the nineteenth century have lost their relevance in the
context of modern notions of claim joinder and judicial economy.  The 
California Supreme Court’s attempts to revise the primary rights 
approach to reflect these changes have only made the doctrine less 
certain.
The California courts acknowledge that the California primary rights 
doctrine is complicated by historical precedent which in several areas
established primary rights “in a manner contrary to the result that might
be reached by a purely logical approach.”127  This admission does little 
to diminish the uncertainty that confronts litigants and trial courts who
must administer the doctrine.  Moreover, with the change to unrestricted 
permissive joinder of claims in 1971, the continued vitality of these 
historical precedents is also in doubt. 
Under the California Supreme Court’s current “harm suffered”
approach, there is little certainty as to which of the earlier lower court 
precedents are still valid today.  Although the California Supreme Court 
endorsed the personal injury/property damage distinction for tort actions 
in dicta in Holmes, the Court has not held, since the enactment of
unrestricted joinder of claims in 1971, that a single tortious act that 
causes injury to both persons and property violates more than one 
primary right.  This distinction was made by Pomeroy in the nineteenth
century and assumed by the lower courts more recently, but nothing in 
the current “harm suffered” jurisprudence informs a party that he may
safely seek recovery for such injuries in two separate proceedings.
Likewise, the California Supreme Court has never held that unitary
tortious conduct which causes injury to personal property and to real
property constitutes two different primary rights.128  Litigants who rely
127. Sawyer v. First City Fin. Corp., 177 Cal. Rptr. 398, 403 (Ct. App. 1981).
128. This primary rights distinction is particularly precarious.  It has been made in
only one court of appeal decision, McNulty v. Copp, 271 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954), 
and was never endorsed by Professor Pomeroy. See supra notes 37, 45 & 55 and 
accompanying text.
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on this distinction, or any other primary rights distinction announced by
the lower courts, do so at their own peril. 
Ironically, the very unpredictability of California’s primary rights 
doctrine may have produced, as a practical matter, some substantive 
judicial economy.  The general uncertainty in California as to the precise 
limits of a “cause of action” for res judicata purposes has a sufficient in 
terrorem effect to force parties to bring all related rights to relief in one 
action, even if some of these rights might be considered separate causes
of action under the primary rights theory.129  This fear of the unknown,
coupled with the time restrictions imposed by statutes of limitations and
the financial impracticality of commencing a separate action to redress 
each separate primary right invaded by a defendant’s wrongful act,
likely means that prudent attorneys will decide to pursue all rights to 
relief in a single lawsuit.  However, a doctrine that achieves economies 
through unpredictable rules is not simply an analytically dishonest one, 
but is also one that inevitably produces vexatious litigation and wasted
judicial resources when parties fail, for whatever reason, to pursue all
rights to relief in one proceeding. Clear rules with predictable
applications and foreseeable consequences are a far better method of
obtaining the desired economies. 
The primary rights approach to res judicata is both substantively and 
administratively inefficient.  This claim preclusion doctrine not only 
fails to accomplish the goals of judicial efficiency and party repose, but
is actually counterproductive as to these goals.  What, then, should be
done about this problem?  The best solution, the one that achieves both 
substantive and administrative efficiencies and does so in a manner that
protects the parties’ expectations of a fair opportunity to litigate claims 
on the merits, is to jettison the primary rights theory and replace it with 
the Restatement’s transactional approach.130 
129. See Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 12-13.  Professor Friedenthal made this in
terrorem observation about imprecise limits of a cause of action for res judicata purposes 
with respect to other jurisdictions, not California, that defined the scope of a cause of 
action in terms of “operative facts.” Id.  Because California’s primary rights definition
of a cause of action was narrower than the “operative facts” theory, Friedenthal argued 
that the California legislature should enact a mandatory joinder of claims statute to 
compel parties to litigate related causes of action in a single lawsuit.  Id. at 13-14, 37. 
For additional discussion of such a mandatory joinder of claims statute, see infra notes 
161-166 and accompanying text. 
130. This same recommendation was made by the author Robin James, supra note 
8, at 408, 411-413.  The author’s main proposal, however, was that the California 
legislature should replace the current permissive joinder of claims statute, § 427.10 of 
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The primary rights theory is the product of judge-made law. 
Consequently, the California Supreme Court can alter the current 
doctrine by the simple expedient of overruling precedent.131  Because the
court’s current primary rights approach is of little predictive 
significance, adoption of the Restatement should raise few concerns
about prospective reliance on an established doctrine.  Moreover, 
although adoption of the Restatement would dramatically change the 
court’s claim preclusion analysis, the effect on the California Supreme 
Court’s prior holdings would be minimal.  Of all the California Supreme 
Court decisions on claim preclusion during the past fifty or so years, 
only the Agarwal holding would likely have been different if the 
Restatement’s transactional standard had been applied.132  However, as 
discussed below, the impact on court of appeal precedent would be far
more pronounced.133 
the CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, with a mandatory joinder of claims statute. 
Id. at 408-411.  Such a statute would require a plaintiff to join in one lawsuit all causes 
of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. Id.  The attributes of  and 
problems with a mandatory joinder of claims statute are discussed infra notes 161-166 
and accompanying text.
131. The highest courts in several other states have adopted the RESTATEMENT
generally, and the transactional standard specifically, as their claim preclusion doctrine.
See supra note 27.  In Reilly v. Reid, 379 N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1978), for example, the 
Court of Appeals of New York adopted the second RESTATEMENT, then a Tentative
Draft, as New York’s res judicata doctrine.  Like California, New York’s civil practice
code is based on the original Field Code and had at one time included a categorical
joinder-of-claims limitation similar to that of former § 427 of the CALIFORNIA CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.  The Court of Appeals
noted that the classic definition of “same cause of action” had an unclear meaning and 
was inconsistent with considerations of judicial economy. Reilly, 379 N.E.2d at 174­
175. The Court endorsed the second RESTATEMENT’s transactional approach generally, 
and observed that the various RESTATEMENT’s rules would determine subtle situations. 
Id. at 176. 
In Rush v. City of Maple Heights, 147 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
814 (1958), the Ohio Supreme Court replaced the primary rights theory with a 
transactional standard as Ohio’s claim preclusion doctrine.  In adopting the transactional
standard, the Rush court overruled established Ohio precedent which previously had held
that a person who suffers both personal injury and property damage as a result of the 
same tortious act has two causes of action.  147 N.E.2d at 607. 
132. If the Court had applied the RESTATEMENT’s transactional standard instead of 
the primary rights approach, it would likely have reached the same res judicata 
conclusion in Wulfjen, Slater, Holmes, Panos, and most of its other decisions during the 
past 60 years. See infra Part II for discussion of these decisions.  However, the Supreme
Court would likely have reached a different claim preclusion result in Agarwal if it had
applied the RESTATEMENT standard because the plaintiff’s federal court action for civil
rights remedies and subsequent state court action for tort damages both sought rights to
relief which arose from the “same transaction or series of connected transactions,” that
is, the defendant’s dismissal of plaintiff from employment and wrongful treatment before 
and after the dismissal. 
133. See infra notes 148-160 and accompanying text.  The Sawyer holding would 
most likely have been different under the RESTATEMENT’s standard—the plaintiffs­
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The California Supreme Court has recognized that the principles of
stare decisis permit the court to reconsider, and ultimately to depart
from, its own prior precedent in appropriate circumstances.134  The Court 
will examine developments occurring subsequent to a decision to 
determine whether that decision was incorrectly decided and has 
generated unnecessary confusion, costly litigation, and inequitable 
results.135 One important inquiry is whether the lower courts
experienced considerable difficulties in applying the doctrine established 
by the prior decision: Has the precedent presented the appellate courts
with a number of unanswered questions, and have these courts reached
varying and often inconsistent conclusions in response?136  Another
relevant inquiry concerns the criticisms or rejections of the decision by 
the courts of other jurisdictions: Since the California Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the doctrine, how many other states have expressly or
implicitly rejected the holding?137  A third relevant inquiry is whether
scholarly commentary has been generally critical of the decision and the
underlying analysis.138  Consideration of these and other related factors
may convince the Court to overrule its prior decision in favor of a 
different rule of law.139  As this Article seeks to demonstrate, the
developments in the area of res judicata subsequent to the California 
Supreme Court’s adoption of the primary rights doctrine in the 
Nineteenth Century, and its most recent reaffirmation of that doctrine in 
Agarwal in 1979, provide convincing grounds for reexamination of the 
soundness of that doctrine and for its replacement with a new general
rule based on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Because of the 
sellers’ actions for breach of contract and for tort arose from the same real estate
transaction with the defendants. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.  The 
conclusions in the Craig line of cases, the Martinez-Ferrer line of cases, and in Branson
would likely have been different, unless some exception to the RESTATEMENT’s general
rule against claim-splitting were applicable.  See supra notes 95-101, 111-115 & 116­
126, and accompanying text. 
134. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 673 (Cal. 
1995); Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 62-63 (Cal. 1988). 
135. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 674-79; Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 
63-68. 
136. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 674-77; Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 67-68. 
137. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 677-78; Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 63-64. 
138. See Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 678-79; Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 64-65. 
139. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 679-80 (overruling a 1984 decision
which had established the tort of bad faith denial of a contract); Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d 
at 68-69 (overruling a 1979 holding which had held that a private third-party claimant 
may sue an insurer for engaging in unfair claims settlement practices).
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reliance interest of parties and society in the primary rights doctrine, a 
new rule adopting the Restatement as California’s res judicata doctrine
should be prospective only.140 
Although not a panacea for all the difficult preclusion problems
discussed in this Article, formal adoption of the Restatement would be a 
marked improvement in both substantive and administrative efficiency
over the primary rights doctrine.  The Restatement’s definition of 
“claim” (or “cause of action”) would make the claim extinguished by a
prior judgment coterminous with the factual transaction which gave rise 
to the action, regardless of the number of primary rights that may have 
been invaded.141 
As a result, a unitary transaction or occurrence would give rise to only
one cause of action which must be pursued in one lawsuit.  Any matter 
arising from that transaction which is not presented in the one lawsuit
will be forever barred.142  The substantive efficiency is obvious.  By
adoption of the Restatement, a single wrongful act by a defendant will 
no longer provide the plaintiff with the potential of multiple causes of
action and multiple lawsuits, as is currently possible under primary
rights jurisprudence. 
The adoption of the Restatement would also result in significant
improvements to the administrative efficiency of California’s claim 
preclusion rules.  As discussed above, the primary rights theory currently
endorsed by the California courts is unpredictable as to its consequences 
and therefore causes inefficient use of judicial resources. The 
transactional definition of a “claim” is easier to understand than the 
primary rights theory and would be more predictable in application. 
Attorneys and courts are already familiar with the transactional standard
because that standard has been employed for several years in a variety of 
procedural rules.143  For example, since 1972 California’s compulsory
140. See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal, 758 P.2d at 69; People v. Latimer, 858 P.2d 611 (Cal. 
1993).
141. In explaining the rationale for the transactional view of claim, the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982) observes:
The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it
coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive 
theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be 
available to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of primary rights that may
have been invaded; and regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to 
support the theories or rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unity
or entity which may not be split.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24 cmt. a. 
142. See supra notes 19, 25-33 and accompanying text. 
143. The federal courts long ago adopted the second RESTATEMENT’s transactional 
approach to determine the claim preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment; and a
majority of states have adopted it as their res judicata doctrine. See authorities cited
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cross-complaint statute has required a defendant to plead a cross-
complaint where the cause of action asserted in the cross-complaint
arises from the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences” as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleged in the 
complaint.144 Other state and federal joinder rules have incorporated a
“same transaction or occurrence” test for several years,145 as has the
relation-back doctrine for amended complaints in federal court.146 
Consequently, lawyers and judges frequently interpret the transactional 
standard in several procedural contexts; by contrast, they rarely 
encounter the primary rights theory.147  The transactional standard is so
supra notes 27 and 86. 
144. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10(c), 428.10(b) (Deering 1996) (compulsory
cross-complaints and new party cross-complaints). See id. § 426.30(d).   
A party’s failure to plead a compulsory cross-complaint constitutes a waiver of that
cause of action. Id. § 426.30(a).  By enacting this transactional standard for compulsory
cross-complaints in 1972, the California Legislature has already imposed a transactional 
claim preclusion standard in many common types of cases.  See James, supra note 8, at 
402-403. Consider the typical car crash case.  See id.; see also supra note 26. Assume
that defendant’s van collided with plaintiff’s car on the freeway, and that assignment of
fault is unclear.  Both parties were seriously injured, and their respective vehicles were
destroyed.  Under the current res judicata approach, the defendant’s act invaded two of
plaintiff’s primary rights: The right to be free from tortious injury (1) to  person and (2) 
to property.  Plaintiff has two causes of action which plaintiff may pursue in two lawsuits 
under the primary rights theory. Likewise, defendant has the same two causes of action
against the plaintiff.
Regardless of which cause of action the plaintiff alleges in the first lawsuit, 
California’s compulsory cross-complaint statute requires the defendant to assert as a
cross-complaint any cause of action that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence.
See  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10(a), 426.30(a) (Deering 1996).  Therefore the 
defendant must plead both his personal injury and property damage claims against the 
plaintiff because, pursuant to section 426.30(a), any cause of action not plead is barred 
from assertion in another action.  If the defendant pleads either or both of his causes of 
action by cross-complaint against the plaintiff, the cross-complaint statute—which 
defines “plaintiff” to mean a person who files a complaint or cross-complaint—then
requires the plaintiff to plead any cause of action which arises out of the same 
transaction or occurrence which defendant alleged in his cross-complaint.  Id. §§
426.10(a)-(c), 426.30(a).  The net practical effect of the compulsory cross-complaint 
statute is that the transactional standard and not the primary rights theory ultimately
applies to determine what rights to relief must be litigated in many typical cases, such as
automobile negligence litigation.
145. The “same transaction or occurrence” test appears in California’s permissive 
joinder of parties statutes, §§ 378(a) (1) & 379(a) (1), as well as in the FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), 14(a), 20(a) (compulsory counterclaims,
impleader, and permissive joinder of parties respectively).
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)(2).
147. Because courts frequently encounter the “same transaction” test in other
procedural areas, and because the federal courts and a majority of state courts apply it as
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ubiquitous in civil procedure, and so familiar to attorneys and judges, 
that its adoption as California’s res judicata doctrine will seem like 
meeting an old friend.  This familiarity alone should increase the 
predictability of California’s claim preclusion doctrine. 
There is another practical reason why adoption of the Restatement will 
increase the predictability of California’s res judicata doctrine.  When 
lawyers and judges are called upon to answer a primary rights question, 
their only sources of guidance are vague treatises and erratic court 
decisions. In contrast, if lawyers and judges encounter a question as to 
the proper application of res judicata under the Restatement, they can 
obtain guidance from the clear black-letter rules and exceptions which
comprise the Restatement. In those applications where the black-letter
transactional standard does not provide a clear determination, the 
Restatement provides extensive comments and numerous illustrations to 
further guide litigants and courts. In short, the Restatement approach is
more predictable because it contains clearer, more precise, and better
explained standards than does the primary rights approach. 
B. The Effect of the Adoption of the Restatement on 

Agarwal and Its Progeny 

Adoption of the Restatement may not automatically resolve all the 
difficult claim preclusion questions discussed in this Article, but it 
would provide parties and courts with a simpler, less elastic approach to
their resolution.  Because the definition of “claim” broadly encompasses 
all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against a defendant with respect to 
all or any part of the transaction or “series of connected transactions”148 
out of which the action arose, cases which now struggle with the legacy
of Agarwal would be more easily resolved. 
For example, the conflict over whether dismissal from public 
employment creates one or two causes of action, as exemplified by the
Craig and the Takahashi lines of cases, would no longer focus on 
whether the harms suffered constituted one or two primary rights.  Under 
their claim preclusion doctrine, a large body of judicial interpretations of that test already 
exist to supplement the blackletter rules contained in the second RESTATEMENT. These
numerous judicial interpretations, along with the RESTATEMENT’s extensive comments 
and illustrations, provide much-needed guidance to litigants and trial courts. These 
considerable pre-existing sources of guidance mean that the oft-construed transactional
test should be far more predictable in application than the infrequently construed primary
rights theory. 
148. The second RESTATEMENT also instructs that what factual grouping constitutes
a “transaction,” and what groupings constitute a “series of transactions,” should be 
determined pragmatically giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether they form a convenient trial 
unit.  RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24(2); see also supra note 19. 
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the Restatement’s transactional standard, a dismissed employee must
present for adjudication all rights to remedies against the defendant with
respect to the transaction (i.e., the dismissal), or series of connected
transactions (i.e., improper treatment preceding or otherwise related to 
the dismissal) in one proceeding or those rights will be extinguished.
Unlike the muddled primary rights analysis, the warning to parties and
courts under the Restatement is clear: All rights to relief, whether based 
on state or federal civil rights statutes, tort or contract, statute or 
common law, and whether seeking reinstatement, back pay, or personal 
jury damages, must be pursued in the initial proceeding. In the context 
of dismissal from public employment, this means that all such rights to
relief must be pursued through the administrative hearing process and, if
unsuccessful there, through a subsequent administrative mandamus 
lawsuit in superior court.149 All such rights to relief will be extinguished 
by the judgment in the first lawsuit unless some exception to the rules of 
merger and bar dictate otherwise.
The message to litigants is clear: bring all rights to relief relating to 
the dismissal in the first proceeding or risk losing them.  If the plaintiff 
presents all rights to relief at the administrative hearing level and loses,
and then seeks judicial review by administrative mandamus, the 
Restatement advises the plaintiff to present “all rights to relief” before
the superior court.  Therefore, under the Restatement, the appropriate
course of litigation conduct is clear and predictable. If the superior court 
refuses to consider the tort allegations because they are premature as a
matter of substantive law, the plaintiff’s right to pursue them in a second
lawsuit is established by an exception to the rule of bar recognized by
the Restatement.150  If the court also determines that it lacks jurisdiction 
149. The court of appeal in one recent decision, Mata v. City of Los Angeles, 24 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (Ct. App. 1993), has indicated that such litigation behavior is currently
a procedural option, although not a requirement. Id. at 318-320. In Mata, the plaintiff 
police officer was terminated from employment after disciplinary proceedings by the 
defendant city.  Plaintiff then filed a court action which sought a writ of mandate
directing the city to reinstate him, combined with counts for compensatory damages for 
violation of a federal civil rights statute.  The Mata court ruled that plaintiff properly
joined the administrative mandamus and damage counts in one lawsuit, but noted that he
had another procedural option available: The plaintiff could have first sought judicial 
review of the city’s decision pursuant to CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE section 1094.5 and
then, after prevailing in that proceeding, filed a separate state or federal court action for 
compensatory damages for wrongful discharge. Id. at 318. 
150. The RESTATEMENT provides the following blackletter exception to the general 
rule that a judgment for the defendant bars another action by the plaintiff on the same 
claim:
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to entertain any requests for relief other than reversal of the 
administrative hearing decision, the Restatement again protects the
plaintiff’s ability to seek damages (for back pay, tort injuries, civil rights 
violations, etc.) or injunctive relief in a separate proceeding.151 Because
A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the
prematurity of the action or on the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a precondition to 
suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has 
matured, or the precondition has been satisfied, unless a second action is 
precluded by operation of the substantive law. 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 20(2). 
This claim preclusion exception provides clear guidance if the superior court decides 
to dismiss premature tort or civil rights damage counts.  A superior court need not, of
course, dismiss such premature actions.  One way to conserve judicial resources is not to
dismiss such damage counts, which public employment cases typically present, but to
stay them until after the administrative mandamus count is determined.  Once the court 
rules on the propriety of the administrative determination, it can decide what to do with 
the plaintiff’s requests for damages. If, for example, the superior court rules that the 
administrative determination was improper, the court may then proceed immediately to
resolve the damage counts.  This approach may be particularly appropriate in those cases 
where the factual record is relatively complete and a remand to the administrative agency
would be futile because the agency, such as the Commission in Takahashi v. Board of
Educ. of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 249 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1011 (1989), lacks jurisdiction to award damages or equitable relief other than 
reinstatement.
 151. The RESTATEMENT recognizes a blackletter exception to the general rule 
against claim-splitting by a plaintiff when the following circumstances exist:
The plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a
certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their authority to 
entertain multiple theories or demands for multiple remedies or forms of relief
in a single action , and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that
theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 26(1) (c).
The RESTATEMENT’s claim preclusion rule, which extinguishes all rights of the 
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to the transaction out of which 
the action arose, is predicated on the assumption that no formal barriers existed against 
full presentation of the claim in the first action. Id. § 26 cmt. c.  Where such formal
barriers in fact existed and were operative against the plaintiff in the first action, the
RESTATEMENT recognizes that it would be unfair to preclude the plaintiff from a second 
action in which he can present those phases of the claim which he was disabled from 
presenting in the first action.  Id. §§ 26 cmt. c, 24 cmt. g. The RESTATEMENT also
observes that such formal limitations on a plaintiff’s ability to seek all forms of relief in a 
single action should no longer exist in a modern system of procedure. Id. §§ 26 cmt. c, 
25 cmt. i.  Quite apart from claim preclusion concerns, judicial administration would be 
more efficient if the California legislature and courts followed this advice with respect to 
administrative mandamus actions. 
The California courts already endorse this exception to the rule against splitting a
cause of action in circumstances where the statutory scheme authorizes cumulative 
remedies and requires a plaintiff to seek certain forms of relief through an administrative 
process and damages through a court action, but prohibits the plaintiff from seeking both 
remedies in one proceeding.  See People v. Damon, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 514 (Ct. App. 
1996) (relying on § 26(1) (c) of the second RESTATEMENT); Branson v. Sun-Diamond
Growers, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 323 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting and relying on § 26(1) (c)
of the second RESTATEMENT); see also cases cited supra note 22. 
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the Restatement clearly instructs litigants as to the appropriate litigation 
behavior in such cases and clearly advises the courts as to the 
appropriate treatment of the various requests for relief, the Restatement
approach to such cases is far more predictable than the current primary
rights analysis.  The savings in litigant and judicial resources are 
obvious.
The Restatement shifts focus away from the determination of whether 
the employer’s wrongful conduct invaded one or more primary rights 
and, therefore, away from the unpredictable vagaries of primary rights
analysis.  The elastic definition of a primary right is replaced by a clear
warning to litigants as to what rights to relief must be presented and by
predictable consequences if such rights are not raised.  The California 
Supreme Court may need to establish some general guidelines to instruct
the lower courts in their treatment of actions which combine requests for 
damages with judicial review by administrative mandamus,152 but once
such procedural guidelines are established, the application of the res 
judicata rules and exceptions will be predictable to litigants and courts 
alike. When such predictability is established, administrative judicial 
economy will follow.




The proper resolution of the double injury problem exemplified by
Martinez-Ferrer and DeRose may remain uncertain under the 
Restatement approach, but the debate will focus more properly on policy
considerations as opposed to vague distinctions regarding the number of 
primary rights invaded by the defendant’s conduct.  The Restatement
152. In a typical case of dismissal from public employment, where the plaintiff
exhausts the available administrative hearing process but is unhappy with the hearing 
determination, the plaintiff may wish to pursue several cumulative (i.e., not mutually
exclusive) remedies when seeking judicial review in court.  These remedies typically 
include reinstatement in the job through the procedural vehicle of administrative 
mandamus to reverse the administrative hearing decision, damages for lost pay and for
emotional distress or perhaps for violation of civil rights, and possibly a request for 
injunctive relief to prevent the defendant employer from engaging in certain activity in
the future.  Absent some substantive or jurisdictional limitation on the plaintiff’s ability
to seek all such relief in one lawsuit, which limitation would trigger exceptions to claim-
splitting, the RESTATEMENT’s transactional definition of a cause of action would preclude 
the plaintiff from seeking cumulative remedies in separate actions.  See supra notes 22
and 151; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 25 cmt. j. 
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clearly and generally instructs plaintiffs to seek recovery in one lawsuit
of all personal injuries, past and prospective, that may arise out of a 
single tortious transaction.153  The doctrine of merger precludes a
plaintiff from maintaining a subsequent action to recover increased
damages even though the plaintiff lacked information about unexpected 
injuries and damages at the time of the first judgment.154  The clear 
general rule under the Restatement is that an injured party, such as the
products liability plaintiff in Martinez-Ferrer, is limited to one action to 
recover damages for all possible injuries caused by an actionable wrong 
including unanticipated serious injuries that first occur long after the 
date of the initial judgment.155  But this general rule is not the endpoint
of the analysis under the Restatement. 
The Restatement suggests two procedures which may ameliorate the
harsh effects of this general rule where a plaintiff attempts to recover
increased damages.  First, the Restatement suggests the possibility of 
relief from the judgment in exceptional cases by means of direct attack, 
such as a motion for new trial on newly discovered evidence or other 
similar procedures for post-judgment relief.156  Second, Section 26(1)(f)
of the Restatement states a black-letter exception to the general rule
against claim-splitting where “[i]t is clearly and convincingly shown that
the policies favoring preclusion of a second action are overcome for an 
extraordinary reason. . . .”157  The comments to this section emphasize 
that this exception applies to a small category of cases involving 
“extraordinary circumstances” in which “the policies supporting merger
or bar may be overcome by other significant policies,” and acknowledge 
that this concept is central to the fair administration of the doctrine of res 
judicata.158 
153. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, §§ 24(1), 25 cmt. c. 
154. See id. §§ 24(1), 25 cmt. c. 
155. See id. §§ 25(1), 25 cmt. c. 
156. See id. § 25 cmt. c. 
157. Id. § 26(1) (f). 
158. Id. § 26 cmt. i.  In contrast to  the RESTATEMENT the California courts do not 
appear to endorse such a public policy exception to the primary rights doctrine.  See, e.g., 
Slater v. Blackwood, 543 P.2d 593, 595 (Cal. 1975) (rejecting argument that courts have 
discretionary power to refuse to apply claim preclusion when to do so would be a 
manifest injustice); Robert J. v. Leslie M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 905, 907-8 (Ct. App. 1997)
(observing that public policy exceptions to claim preclusion are extremely narrow and 
have never enjoyed wide approval or frequent application).  But see Citizens for Open
Access to Said and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(discerning no public policy reason for refusing to invoke res judicata where preclusion
of instant suit will not result in any manifest injustice).
Comment f to section 24 of the RESTATEMENT also suggests that in certain cases a
change in circumstances—material operative facts occurring after the decision of an 
action with respect to the same subject matter—may comprise a transaction which may 
be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first. RESTATEMENT, supra
612
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The adoption of the Restatement will not automatically resolve the
double-injury problem, but will shift the focus of the courts and litigants 
away from vague distinctions as to separate primary rights. Instead, the
focus will be on considerations of fairness and public policy.159  These
considerations may also be subjective, but they are far more meaningful 
and relevant to what is really at stake in these double-injury cases: the 
concerns of judicial economy and of securing fair compensation for the 
plaintiff counterbalanced by the defendant’s interest in finality and 
repose.160  By contrast, the current focus on whether the subsequent 
note 11, § 24 cmt. f.
159. The second RESTATEMENT recognizes two other blackletter exceptions to the 
general rule against claim-splitting which may be relevant in certain types of double-
injury cases.  Section 26(1)(a) provides for a second action in circumstances where the 
parties in the first action have agreed that the plaintiff may split her claim.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 26(1)(a). Section 26(1)(b) provides for a second action
where the court in the first action “expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to maintain the 
second action.” Id. § 26(1)(b). 
These two exceptions may be useful to the parties or the court in those instances where 
the parties know there is a possibility that a more serious disease may materialize later, 
but the probability of the individual plaintiff actually developing this disease is
uncertain.  In these cases, such as asbestos exposure cases where the plaintiff presently
suffers asbestosis and may later develop cancer, both parties and the court may wish to
invoke this exception rather than risk over-compensation (if no future disease actually
occurs) or under-compensation (if the plaintiff develops a disease later which is more
serious than anticipated by the jury) in an all-or-nothing award in the first lawsuit.  These 
consensual exceptions are far less useful, however, in those double-injury cases, such as 
Martinez-Ferrer v. Richardson-Merrel, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Ct. App. 1980), and 
DeRose v. Carswell, 242 Cal Rptr. 368 (Ct. App. 1987), where the subsequent injury was
not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the first judgment. 
160. The double-injury problem is often encountered in asbestos exposure litigation.
See, e.g., Buttram v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 941 P.2d 71 (Cal. 1997) 
(collecting cases).  A majority of jurisdictions have held that an injured plaintiff may 
split his cause of action by first bringing an action for present injuries and subsequently
asserting, in a another lawsuit, a second cause of action if a separate and distinct disease 
caused by the same exposure materializes later.  See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 464 A.2d 1020 (Md. 1983); Marinari v. Asbestos Corp., 612 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (collecting cases), cited with approval in Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 
A.2d 232, 237 (Pa. 1996); Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 498 A.2d 1126, 1133-34 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1985), aff’d sub nom., Keene Corp. v. Sheppard, 503 A.2d 192 (Del. 1986); 
see also  ARVIN MASKIN ET AL, ALI-ABA, OVERVIEW AND  UPDATE OF EMERGING 
DAMAGE THEORIES IN TOXIC TORT LITIGATION, 629, 642-49 (1993) (collecting cases).
The courts in these cases concluded that the later injury constituted a separate cause of 
action, for statute of limitations purposes, even though both the initial injury and the later
manifested disease were caused by the same wrongful act.  See, e.g., Marinari, 612 A.2d 
at 1027-28.  These courts concluded that the defendant’s interest in repose was 
counterbalance and outweighed by other factors, such as fairness to the plaintiff, judicial 
economy, and improvement in the quality of evidence. See, e.g., Wilson, 684 F.2d at 
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D. Judicial Adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments is 





Some critics of California’s claim preclusion doctrine, most notably 
Professor Jack H. Friedenthal, have advocated that the California
legislature should enact a mandatory joinder of claims statute which
would require a plaintiff to join in one lawsuit all claims that arise from
the same transaction or occurrence.161  Because a mandatory joinder of 
119-20; Marinari, 612 A.2d at 1027-28.  A recent California Court of Appeal decision, 
Richmond v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (Ct. App. 1998), certified 
for publication but not yet officially published, reached the same conclusion and held 
that allowing separate causes of action for discrete asbestos exposure diseases does not 
violate the underlying rationale against splitting causes of action. 
Some of these cases indicated that this division of a cause of action for purposes of
statutes of limitations may not necessarily apply in the context of res judicata.  See, e.g., 
Wilson, 684 F.2d at 117-19.  However, other courts relied on the exceptions to the rule 
against claim splitting recognized in the second RESTATEMENT and ruled that a plaintiff
should not be barred, as a matter of res judicata or of statute of limitations, from bringing 
a second suit for separate and distinct injury at the time of the actual manifestation of the
later disease. See, e.g., Marinari, 612 A.2d at 1028; Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox,
481 So. 2d 517, 519-23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 
1986) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1) (b) & (f) and collecting 
cases); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987) (noting that the 
single controversy rule will not preclude a second cause of action for future disease even 
though there has been prior litigation between the parties on different claims based on
the same tortious conduct); In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) 
(applying Maine law); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1987) (ruling that a single cause of action rule will not preclude a later suit for injury
resulting from toxic exposure even though there has been past litigation between the 
parties based on the same conduct). 
Commentators also view the purposes of statutes of limitations and of res judicata as
essentially the same, and therefore argue that a plaintiff in a toxic exposure case should 
be permitted to split a cause of action by bringing an action for present injuries and 
subsequently bringing a second action if a latent disease actually develops in the future. 
See, e.g., David G. Poston, Note, Gone Today and Here Tomorrow: Damage Recovery 
for Subsequent Developing Latent Diseases in Toxic Tort Exposure Actions, 14 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 159 (1990) (discussing cases that expressly rejected single cause of action
rule); Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing
Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1989 (1990) (construing § 26(f) of the second 
RESTATEMENT as authority for claim splitting and concluding that plaintiffs should be 
permitted to bring a second suit for distinct harms that subsequently materialize); 
Demidovich, supra note 116, at 251-252 (arguing that the statute of limitations holding
in Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. should also apply in the res judicata context); 
Kim Marie Covello, Note, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales, Corp. and Statutes of 
Limitations in Latent Injury Litigation: An Equitable Expansion of the Discovery Rule, 
32 CATH .U. L. REV. 471, 492-493 (1981) (suggesting that the Wilson court’s statute of 
limitations holding may be extended to res judicata). 
161. In 1970, Professor Friedenthal suggested a number of revisions to California’s
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claims statute would contain the same transactional test as the
Restatement and would deem any related cause of action waived if not
asserted, enactment of such a statute would achieve many of the judicial
economy benefits of the Restatement in a readily accessible statute.162 
Moreover, these economies would result even if the primary rights 
theory remained as California’s res judicata doctrine.163 
Although this proposal has merit, there are several reasons why 
judicial adoption of the Restatement is preferable to legislative 
enactment of a mandatory joinder of claims statute.  First, the change to
a transactional standard can be obtained more expeditiously by a judicial 
overruling of primary rights precedent in an appropriate case, without
the need for legislative action.164  Second, a mandatory joinder statute
which generally adopts the transactional definition of “related causes of
action” of the compulsory cross-complaints statute may encourage
plaintiffs, in an abundance of statutorily-induced caution, to allege every 
then-existing joinder of claims, counterclaims, and cross-complaints statutes.  One 
suggestion was that the California legislature enact a mandatory joinder of claims statute 
which would require a party to assert all causes of action against the opposing party
which arise out of the same transaction or occurrence in one action; any such cause of 
action not plead would be deemed waived and all rights thereon extinguished.  See
Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 11-12, 37.  Professor Friedenthal advocated that mandatory
joinder of claims should be applicable to plaintiff’s causes of action as well as to those of 
defendant.  Id.  Friedenthal argued this compulsory claim joinder statute was necessary
because, unlike other jurisdictions, California’s common law did not establish 
compulsory joinder by operation of the principles of res judicata. Id.
Professor Friedenthal’s various joinder proposals were adopted as recommendations of
the California Law Revision Commission in 1970.  See Jack H. Friendthal, Joinder of 
Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California 
Provisions, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 581, 581-619 (1971).  Based on these 
recommendations, the California Legislature amended the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE in 
1971 and enacted unlimited permissive joinder of claims for plaintiffs and compulsory
cross-complaints for defendants. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 426.10-426.60, 427.10 (West 
1973); see also supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.  However, the legislature 
rejected the concept of mandatory joinder of claims by plaintiffs. See James, supra note 
8, at 404. 
162. See Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 11-14; James, supra note 8, at 408-411. 
163. A mandatory joinder of claims statute which requires a plaintiff to assert all 
causes of action arising out of the same transaction or occurrence would be unconcerned 
with whether a cause of action was defined as an invasion of a primary right or by some 
other standard. See Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 12-14; James, supra note 8, at 410­
411. Regardless of how a cause of action may be defined, the plaintiff must join them all 
in one lawsuit because any cause of action not pled will be deemed waived.
164. The California legislature rejected a proposed mandatory joinder of causes of 
action statute in 1971, despite recommendations of its adoption by the California Law 
Revision Commission. See supra note 160. 
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conceivable right to relief in one lawsuit.  Consequently, unlike the more
detailed rules and exceptions of the Restatement, such a statute may
foster a different kind of diseconomy: vexatious litigation and judicial 
inefficiency caused by the unnecessary inclusion of allegations in 
complaints which must be responded to by defendants and weeded out
by courts.165 
The most important reason why judicial adoption of the Restatement
as California’s claim preclusion law is preferable to legislative
enactment of a mandatory joinder of claims statute has to do with the
comprehensive nature of the Restatement itself. The Restatement, with 
its black-letter rules and exceptions, its comments and illustrations, 
provides more guidance to courts and litigants, and advises on many 
more difficult problems than could practicably be addressed by a statute. 
The Restatement provides clear guidance as to when certain rights to 
relief need not be alleged because they are preserved for future
proceedings by a black-letter exception to the general rule against claim-
splitting.  A mandatory joinder of claims statute would likely not address 
all the exceptions to the requirements of joinder and, if it did, it would in
effect be a codification of the Restatement’s rules and exceptions.  The 
coverage of such a statute would go far beyond mandatory joinder of 
claims and become, by necessity, a comprehensive res judicata statute. 
A simpler and more effective legislative solution would be for the 
California legislature to enact a statute which declares: “The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments is California’s res judicata law!”  As
noted above, the California Supreme Court can more readily and
expeditiously make this declaration by judicial pronouncement. Such 
judicial action would also render legislative adoption of a mandatory
joinder of claims statute, or of a comprehensive res judicata statute,
unnecessary.166 
For years commentators have criticized California’s primary rights 
approach to res judicata as uncertain and unpredictable.167 The
165. Professor Friedenthal acknowledged that mandatory joinder of claims may
cause unnecessary litigation, but argued that a properly drafted statute would minimized
this danger. See Friedenthal, supra note 39, at 12.  However, he also acknowledged the 
problems of drafting comprehensive mandatory joinder provisions.  Id. at 17. 
166. Professor Friedenthal recognized that the chief argument against mandatory
joinder of claims is that, in the majority of states, “the rules of res judicata make it 
unnecessary” because “the scope of a single cause of action is held broad enough to 
cover all claims arising from a single set of transactions or occurrences.”  Id. at 12. 
167. As early as 1947, legal scholars have discussed the problems associated with
the definition of a “cause of action” based on the primary rights theory, and have 
advocated adoption of a less vague and more economical standard for res judicata 
purposes. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING
130-40 (2d ed. 1947); Comment, Cause of Action Broadened in California, 1 STAN. L.
REV. 156 (1948); Arlo E. Smith, Comment, Res Judicata in California, 40 CAL. L. REV. 
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California Supreme Court often has been an independent leader in many
areas of jurisprudence.  But in the area of res judicata, the time has come
for it to follow the federal courts and the vast majority of states.  The 
Court should recognize, as have these other jurisdictions, that 
improvement in predictability and, therefore, judicial economy is more 
important than preserving tradition. The California Supreme Court 
should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Judgments as California’s
claim preclusion doctrine, as it already has done with respect to issue 
preclusion.168 
412, 414-419 (1952); James, supra note 8 at 351; see also Friedenthal, supra note 39; 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 24 cmt. a.  Judge Clark criticized Pomeroy’s primary 
rights view of a cause of action as vague, as susceptible to a broad or narrow
interpretation by a court, and as an imprecise measure of the limits of a single cause of 
action. See  CLARK, supra, at 130, 135-36. The primary rights definition of a cause of 
action, Judge Clark observed, “gives a promise of precision and definiteness, which is 
not fulfilled in reality.”  Id. at 134.  Judge Clark recommended replacement of the
primary rights definition of a cause of action with an approach based on an “aggregate of 
operative facts,” an approach related to but not identical with the “same transaction” test. 
Id. at 137-40. 
168. See cases cited supra notes 2 and 74. Formal adoption of the second
RESTATEMENT as California’s claim preclusion doctrine may also improve the 
predictability of California’s issue preclusion doctrine.  As discussed in Heiser, 
Collateral Estoppel, supra note 2, the California courts may have applied collateral 
estoppel in an over-inclusive manner in order to counter the substantive inefficiencies of
the primary rights doctrine. Id. at 527.  In other words, the courts may have broadly
defined the “issue” foreclosed by prior adjudication in order to achieve desired judicial
economies, which could more properly have been obtained through a claim preclusion
doctrine which minimized the possibility of multiple lawsuits arising from unitary
wrongful conduct. Id. at 543-46. 
The Introductory Note to the second RESTATEMENT’s sections on issue preclusion
makes the following observation: 
There is a close relationship between the definition of a “claim” and the sweep 
of the rule of issue preclusion.  Courts laboring under a narrow view of the
dimensions of a claim may on occasion have expanded concepts of issue 
preclusion in order to avoid relitigation of what is essentially the same dispute.
Under a transaction approach to the concept of a claim, on the other hand,
there is less need to rely on issue preclusion to put an end to the litigation of a
particular controversy.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 27 intro. note. 
The RESTATEMENT’s observation may well have been directed at California’s narrow 
definition of a “claim” and broad definition of “issue.”  Adoption of the RESTATEMENT’s 
transactional approach to claim preclusion, an approach that is more inclusive and
predictable than the primary rights approach, may diminish the perceived (and 
understandable) need of the California courts to rely on collateral estoppel to achieve 
substantive economies.  See Heiser, Collateral Estoppel, supra note 2, at 558. 
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